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Ernest E. Figari, Jr., *
A. Erin Dwyer** and
Donald Colleluori***
PE major developments in the field of civil procedure during the Sur-
ve period occurred through judicial decisions.'
I. JURISDICTION OF THE SUBJECT MATTER
With the failure of several federally insured savings and loan associations
in Texas2 and the appointment of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC) as receiver for those associations, the FSLIC and the
courts of this state have engaged in a jurisdictional tug-of-war.3 The FSLIC
has argued, relying on federal enactments,4 that when its appointment as a
receiver occurs, state courts are ousted of jurisdiction to hear claims involv-
ing the failed association and, instead, the FSLIC has the exclusive power to
adjudicate those claims.5 The FSLIC's opponents perceive it as less than
* B.S., Texas A & M University; LL.B., University of Texas; LL.M., Southern Method-
ist University. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
•* B.A., University of Notre Dame; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Dallas,
Texas.
•** B.A., Dickinson College; J.D., New York University. Attorney at Law, Dallas,
Texas.
1. One should note that the Texas Supreme Court is presently considering significant
amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and Appellate Procedure. See Texas
Supreme Court Invites Comments on Proposed Amendments to Texas Court Rules, 52 TEX.
BJ. 1147 (1989). Since these changes are in a preliminary stage and have not been adopted,
they will be discussed in a future survey article when they actually become effective.
2. See, e.g., Glidden, Portrait of an Industry in Crisis, D Mag., May 1987, at 94; Area
S&L Declared Insolvent, Dallas Morning News, May 21, 1987, at Al, col. 2; Losses Leave S&L
Insolvent, Dallas Times Herald, Sept. 5, 1986, at Al, cal. 3; The Fall of an Empire-Auditors
Untangle Web of Records to Find S&L Insolvent, Dallas Times Herald, Mar. 25, 1984, at KI,
col. 1.
3. See, eg., FSLIC v. Glen Ridge I Condominium, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. 1988) (per
curiam) cert denied, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1637, 104 L.Ed.2d 153 (1989); FSLIC v. Kennedy,
732 S.W.2d I (rex. App.-Houston [lIst Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Summertree Venture
III v. FSLIC, No. C14-86-924CV (rex. App.-Houston [14 Dist.] Nov. 5, 1987, no writ). See
generally, Figari, Graves & Dwyer, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 43
Sw. LJ. 485 (1989) [hereinafter Figari, 1989 Annual Survey].
4. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C)(1982 & Supp. 1989), which provides that "no court
may... restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of a conservator or receiver [ie.,
FSLIC]"; 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d), which provides that "[i]n connection with the liquidation of
insured institutions, the [FSLIC] shall [be] ... subject only to the regulation of the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board."
5. See Felt, FSLIC Receivership Claims Procedures, 1987 ALI-ABA COURSE OF
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impartial in deciding claims involving such an association. Furthermore, the
asserted adjudicatory power in the FSLIC would serve to deprive those op-
ponents of a jury trial. Thus, the FSLIC's opponents usually challenge the
FSLIC's jurisdiction.
Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC,6 a recent decision of the
United States Supreme Court, appears to have settled this jurisdictional dis-
pute. The Supreme Court framed the question as "whether Congress
granted the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), as
receiver, the exclusive authority to adjudicate the state law claims asserted
against a failed savings and loan association."' 7 The Court concluded that
"[t]he statutes governing FSLIC... do not grant FSLIC adjudicatory power
over creditors' claims against insolvent savings and loan associations under
FSLIC receivership, nor do they divest the courts of jurisdiction to consider
those claims de novo."8
A recent decision of the Dallas Court of Appeals, Gaynier v. Ginsberg,9
considered the doctrine of primary jurisdiction as it relates to a statutory
probate court. The personal representative of an estate had filed suit in the
district court, asserting claims for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, trespass to
try title, and seeking the removal of a trustee. Virtually all of the claims
were incident to the estate. On the eve of trial, the district court granted a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the statutory probate court had pri-
mary subject matter jurisdiction of the suit. In this regard, section 5A(b) of
the Texas Probate Code, which establishes the primary jurisdiction of the
statutory probate court, stipulates that "[i]n situations where the jurisdiction
of a statutory probate court is concurrent with that of a district court, a
cause appertaining to estates or incident to an estate shall be brought in a
statutory probate court rather than in a district court."10 Holding that the
claim for the removal of a trustee, though incident to the estate, was within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the district court, the court of appeals concluded
that the probate court was powerless to afford all of the relief requested and
ordered the suit reinstated."1 Reasoning that section 5A(b) did not divest
the district court of jurisdiction over a matter which may be incident to an
estate if the probate court cannot grant full relief, the court held that section
5A(b) did not reduce the jurisdiction of the district court and therefore the
district court should have continued to exercise jurisdiction over the entire
suit. 12
STUDY: FAILING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 529 (setting forth Federal Home Loan
Bank Board procedures when FSLIC is receiver).
6. - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1361, 103 L.Ed.2d 602 (1989).
7. Id. at 1364.
8. Id. at 1368. See generally Baxter, Life in the Administrative Track. Administrative
Adjudication of Claims Against Savings Institution Receiverships, 1988 DUKE L.J. 422, 484-85
(1988); Note, 10 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 227, 257-60 (1988).
9. 763 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
10. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5A(b) (Vernon Supp. 1990) (emphasis added).




II. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
The reach of the Texas long-arm statute 13 is continually the subject of
judicial measurement. This statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction
over a nonresident when he is doing business in Texas. 14 A nonresident does
business, according to the statute, if, among other things, the nonresident
"commits a tort in whole or in part in this state." 15 A recent Fifth Circuit
decision, Irving v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp.,1 6 reiterated a two-pronged
test for meeting the requirements of due process when effecting service under
the statute. In this regard, the court concluded that:
The due process clause permits a district court to exercise personal
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants when (1) they have sufficient
"ninimum contacts" with the forum; and (2) the exercise ofjurisdiction
does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice." 17
Irving is also significant in its use of the stream of commerce analysis to
determine whether a defendant had sufficient minimum contacts with the
forum so as to satisfy the first part of the test.18 The plaintiffs, two residents
of Texas, sued several defendants, one of whom was a Yugoslavian corpora-
tion, for products liability arising out of their exposure to asbestos during
their employment with a Texas firm. Plaintiffs effected service over the Yu-
goslavian corporation under the Texas long-arm statute; and it responded
with a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Subsequently, the
trial court dismissed the claims against the alien defendant and an appeal
from that ruling ensued.
The record disclosed that the alien defendant, which was neither qualified
to do business in Texas nor had any presence in the state, was a trading
company that introduced the asbestos to America after it had been mined in
Yugoslavia by a mining company there. An American broker purchased the
13. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.041-.045 (Vernon 1986 & Supp.
1990) (formerly TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964) (repealed 1985)).
14. Id. § 17.044(b).
15. Id. § 17.042(2).
16. 864 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1989), cert denied, - U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 83, 107 L.Ed.2d 49.
17. Id. at 385, citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct.
154, 158. 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); accord Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 374-77 (5th
Cir. 1987); Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1189 (5th Cir. 1985); D.J. Inv., Inc. v.
Metzeler Motorcycle Tire Agent Gregg, Inc., 754 F.2d 542, 544-45 (5th Cir. 1985); C & H
Transp. Co. v. Jensen & Reynolds Constr. Co., 719 F.2d 1267, 1269 (5th Cir. 1983), cert
denied, 466 U.S. 945, 104 S.Ct. 1390, 80 L.Ed.2d 475 (1984); Hydrokinetics, Inc. v. Alaska
Mechanical, Inc., 700 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 962, 104 S.Ct.
2180, 80 L.Ed.2d 561 (1984).
18. Id. at 385-88. Under the so-called stream of commerce theory of personal jurisdic-
tion, "[w]hen a nonresident defendant introduces a product into interstate commerce under
circumstances that make it reasonable to expect that the product may enter the forum state,
the forum may assert jurisdiction over the defendant in a suit arising out of injury caused by
the product in the forum." Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1234 (5th Cir.
1973). Actual knowledge that the product will be marketed in the forum is unnecessary; if the
nonresident defendant had reason to know that the product would reach the forum, the forum
may exercise personal jurisdiction over the nonresident. See Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d
191, 201-02 (5th Cir. 1980).
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asbestos from the alien defendant and, in turn, sold it to the Texas firm
where the two plaintiffs were employed. This supply relationship encom-
passed fifteen years and, while the alien defendant did not know the identity
of the ultimate purchaser, it was aware that the ultimate destination of the
asbestos was Texas. Emphasizing the fact that it was neither the manufac-
turer of the asbestos nor the party who sold it to the plaintiffs' Texas em-
ployer, the alien defendant argued that its role in the supply chain was too
minor to subject it to personal jurisdiction under a stream of commerce anal-
ysis. Rejecting this argument, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the defend-
ant's ignorance of the ultimate purchaser's identity did not defeat the
forum's exercise of jurisdiction, as "[p]ersonal jurisdiction does not require
certain knowledge of the user's identity." 19 Under its stream of commerce
analysis, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the defendant's contacts with
Texas were sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement of the
test.20
The appellate court next turned its attention to the fairness requirement of
the test.2' The Fifth Circuit observed that the case was one of 106 consoli-
dated suits against twenty-one defendants for alleged injuries arising in
Texas and linked to the asbestos the Yugoslavian corporation distributed.22
Concluding that Texas was the most convenient and efficient forum in which
to try these cases, and that Texas has a special interest in providing a forum
to procure compensation for alleged injuries that occurred in Texas, the
court held that the contacts were sufficient to meet the second part of the
test. 23
While earlier cases have opened the door to a broadened use of the Texas
long-arm statute,24 the recent decision of the court of appeals in Southern
Clay Products, Inc. v. Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance, Ltd. 25 seems to
have torn the door from its hinges. The nonresident defendant, an English
insurance company, with no ties to the United States, issued an insurance
policy to an English company, which policy provided liability coverage to
the policy holider and its subsidiaries, one of whom was noted in an endorse-
ment to the policy merely as being located in the U.S.A. This subsidiary, a
Texas corporation, subsequently settled a liability claim brought against it
arising out of an accident that occurred in Texas. A dispute subsequently
arose over the foreign insurance company's duty to reimburse the Texas sub-
sidiary under the policy that had been issued to its English parent. The
subsidiary, thereafter, sued the nonresident insurer in Texas for breach of
contract and effected service under the long-arm statute. The defendant ob-
jected to personal jurisdiction and, after the trial court sustained the chal-
19. Irving, 864 F.2d at 386.
20. Id. at 386.
21. Id. at 387.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 387-88.
24. See Reul v. Sahara Hotel, 372 F. Supp. 995 (S.D. Tex. 1974); Bland v. Kentucky Fried
Chicken Corp., 338 F. Supp. 871 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
25. 762 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1988, writ granted).
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lenge, an appeal followed. Conceding that the insurance agreement was
between two English companies, was negotiated and implemented in Eng-
land, and did not reference Texas, the court of appeals nevertheless reversed
and held the nonresident defendant subject to suit in Texas.26 The court
concluded that the nonresident defendant had agreed to cover risks any-
where in the world, and that this was sufficient notice of potentially insured
activities throughout the United States. Thus, the acceptance of this broad
risk indicated the insurer's willingness to be haled into court in any state
where a United States subsidiary was involved with a covered accident.27
The plaintiff in Luker v. Luker 28 attempted to stretch the reach of the
long-arm statute beyond due process limits. The plaintiff, a Texas resident,
was injured in an automobile accident in Louisiana while riding in a car
driven by her sister-in-law, a Louisiana resident. She later sued her sister-in-
law in Texas to recover for the injuries she sustained and effected service on
her under the statute. When the sister-in-law appeared, she challenged per-
sonal jurisdiction and the trial court sustained her plea. The plaintiff ap-
pealed, relying on the fact that her sister-in-law had once lived in Texas, had
purchased and financed an automobile there, and currently possessed only a
Texas driver's license. Affirming the dismissal, the appellate court held that
these contacts were too few to satisfy the requirements of due process. 29
A relatively obscure provision3" of the Texas long-arm statute received
considerable attention during the survey period. A provision of that statute
stipulates that when process is delivered to the Secretary of State for for-
warding to a nonresident defendant, the Secretary of State "shall require a
statement of the name and address of the nonresident's home or home of-
fice" to facilitate such forwarding. 31 Two cases, Cardan Corp. v. Sonner 32
and Bank ofAmerica v. Love 33, recently considered this address requirement
as it related to a corporate defendant. The record before the court in Carjan
revealed that the Secretary of State received only the last known address of
the corporate defendant and that he forwarded process to that location. The
plaintiff obtained a default judgment based on this service, and the defendant
sought to set it aside, arguing noncompliance with the statutory provision.
Finding that the last known address was not the equivalent of the home
office address required by the statute, the court concluded the statute had
not been satisfied and set aside the judgment.34
Similarly, in Love the default judgment record reflected that a post office
box had been designated as the service address for the corporate defendant;
26. Id. at 932.
27. Id.
28. 776 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, writ denied).
29. Id. at 626.
30. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.045(A) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
31. Id.
32. 765 S.W.2d 553 (rex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ).
33. 770 S.W.2d 890 (rex. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ denied).
34. Id. at 555; accord Verges v. Lomas Nettleton Fin. Corp., 642 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1982, no writ); see Southern Distrib. Co. v. Technical Support Assoc., Inc., 105
F.RLD. 1, 2 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
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however, the record was devoid of any indication that it was the defendant's
home office. Invalidating the default judgment based on that service, the
court held that the statute's address requirement had not been fulfilled. 35
Love is also significant because the plaintiff argued that the defect was imma-
terial since the defendant had received actual notice of the suit. Rejecting
this contention, the court ruled that a showing of actual notice was irrele-
vant because such notice is insufficient unless it is notice received in the man-
ner prescribed by the statute.36
The address provision of the statute was also interpreted in two instances
where service was made on an individual defendant and a default judgment
was subsequently taken on the basis of such service. 37 The record in Chaves
v. Todaro38 showed that the Secretary of State received only an office ad-
dress for the individual defendant and that the Secretary forwarded process
to that address. In an attempt to sustain a default judgment predicated on
this service, the plaintiff argued that the statute had been satisfied because
the individual's office address was the same as his home office. Rejecting this
argument, the court reasoned that the reference to home office in the statute
was inapplicable to an individual and that, in the case of a natural person, a
home address must be utilized.39 The second case, Bannigan v. Market
Street Developers, Ltd.,40 arose from a challenge to a default judgment taken
against an individual defendant in a suit on a lease. Arguing that the address
requirement of the statute had been fulfilled, the plaintiff noted that the
lease, attached as an exhibit to its petition, included a "Notice Address" for
the defendant. Since the record showed that process had been forwarded to
that address, the plaintiff argued that the statute had been satisfied. The
court set aside the default judgment, however, observing that nothing in the
record indicated the Notice Address in the lease was the same as the defend-
ant's home address.41
I1. SERVICE OF PROCESS
Pleasant Homes, Ina v. Allied Bank of Dallas,42 a recent decision of the
Texas Supreme Court, appears to have settled a long-standing conflict
among the intermediate appellate courts.43 When a default judgment is
taken against a corporate defendant, and the corporation thereafter seeks to
35. 770 S.W.2d at 891-92.
36. Id. at 892.
37. Chaves v. Todaro, 770 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. App.-Houston (lst Dist.] 1989, no writ);
Bannigan v. Market Street Developer's, Ltd., 766 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no
writ).
38. 770 S.W.2d at 944.
39. Id. at 946.
40. 766 S.W.2d at 591.
41. Id. at 593.
42. 776 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. 1989) (per curiam), denying appl'n for writ of error, 757 S.W.2d
460 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989).
43. See, e.g., Bronze & Beautiful, Inc. v. Mahone, 750 S.W.2d 28, 29 (rex. App.-Texar-
kana 1988, no writ); Encore Builders v. Wells, 636 S.W.2d 722, 723 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1982, no writ).
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set it aside on the basis of improper service, the authority of the person
served is invariably the focus of the attack.44 Previously, some intermediate
appellate courts had invalidated the default judgment if the record did not
contain proof, independent of statements in the pleadings, citation, and re-
turn, as to the agency of the individual served.45 Other courts held that
statements in the pleadings, citation, and return were sufficient to establish
the agency or capacity of the representative served.46 Finally, still other
courts imposed the burden on the corporate defendant to prove at a hearing
following the default judgment that the representative served was not its
agent.47
In Pleasant Homes a trial court had entered a default judgment against a
bank. The only showing in the record of the authority or capacity of the
party served was a statement by the service officer contained in the cita-
tion.48 Finding this to be a sufficient showing, the supreme court empha-
sized that "[lt is not necessary for either the petition or citation to designate
the officer to be served by name if the face of the record affirmatively shows
the person's authority. '49 The court noted that if a return indicates that the
officer delivered process to a vice-president or president, the return serves as
prima facie evidence that the person served was in fact the designated of-
ficer."50 According to the supreme court, "[a] defendant who contends that
the person served was not in fact a proper officer for service has the burden
to present evidence to the trial court of improper service by motion for new
trial or motion to set aside default judgment." 51
Rule 107 provides that "[n]o default judgment shall be granted in any
cause until the citation... shall have been on file with the clerk of the court
ten days, exclusive of the day of filing and the day of judgment. '52 Gerdes v.
Marion State Bank 5 3 and Gibraltar Savings Association v. Kilpatrick 54 con-
44. Id.
45. See NBSS., Inc. v. Mail Box, Inc., 772 S.W.2d 470,471 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ
denied); Hanover Modular Homes of Taft, Inc. v. Corpus Christi Bank & Trust, 476 S.W.2d
97, 99 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1972, no writ); Texaco, Inc. v. McEwen, 356 S.W.2d
809, 814 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dalas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
46. See National Medical Enter. v. Wedman, 676 S.W.2d 712, 715-16 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1984, no writ); Hillson Steel Prod., Inc. v. Wirth Ltd., 538 S.W.2d 162, 164 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston list Dist.] 1976, no writ).
47. See Southland Paint Co. v. Thousand Oaks Racket Club, 724 S.W.2d 809, 810 (Tex.
App.--San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Employer's Reinsurance Corp. v. Brock, 74
S.W.2d 435, 438 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1934, writ dism'd).
48. Under the applicable statute governing service on a bank, the president, a vice-presi-
dent, a cashier or an agent for service of process may be served. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 342-915 (Vernon Supp. 1990). In Pleasant Homes neither the petition nor the cita-
tion identified the person to be served by name; however, the citation recited the fact that
"Beverly Walters, V.P." was served. See Allied Bank v. Pleasant Homes, Inc., 757 S.W.2d
460, 463 (rex. App.-Dallas 1988), writ denied, 776 S.W.2d 153 (rex. 1989).
49. Id at 463.
50. 776 S.W.2d at 154; accord Gibraltar Say. Ass'n v. Kilpatrick, 770 S.W.2d 14, 17 (Tex.
App. -Texarkana 1989, writ denied); West Texas Peterbilt, Inc. v. Paso Del Norte Oil Co.,
768 S.W.2d 380, 381 (rex. App.-El Paso 1989, writ denied).
51. 776 S.W.2d at 154.
52. TEX. R. CIV. P. 107.
53. 774 S.W.2d 63 (rex. App.--San Antonio 1989, writ denied).
54. 770 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, writ denied).
1990]
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sidered the validity of a default judgment where the omission of a file date on
the citation caused uncertainty as to fulfillment of the ten day requirement.
The court in Gerdes, joining with earlier cases,55 set aside the default judg-
ment because, in the absence of a file mark on the citation showing when it
had been fied, the record did not affirmatively show compliance with Rule
107.56
Gerdes is also significant because, after the defendant launched its appel-
late attack on the default judgment, the trial court conducted a hearing on
the matter and found that the citation had in fact been in the possession of
the clerk for the required ten days. On the basis of this finding, the trial
court ordered that the omitted file mark be placed on the citation, and the
newly-marked citation was made a part of the appellate record by way of a
supplemental transcript. Although the evidence adduced at the hearing am-
ply supported the trial court's action, the appellate court concluded that the
trial court did not have the authority to add the file mark after the appeal
had been perfected.57
While the citation in Kilpatrick had no file mark showing that the ten day
requirement had been met,58 the default judgment record contained a veri-
fied computer report of the district clerk which provided the necessary filing
information and, in turn, established compliance with Rule 107. 59 Never-
theless, the plaintiff argued that no record existed before the trial court at the
time the judge signed the default judgment because, although the data was in
the computer, the print-out was not prepared until after such signing. Ob-
serving that "[c]omputers are increasingly used to record filings and other
events in judicial proceedings," and "[t]hose computer records can be dis-
played on screens for examination the same as records printed on paper,"
the appellate court held that "[t]he fact that the computerized record has not
yet been reduced to paper writing does not mean it is not a part of the court
record, so long as it is capable of being transcribed." 6"
Former Rule 101 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which set forth
the requirements of a citation, stipulated that the clerk should direct the
citation to the defendant. 61 The failure to comply with the requirement re-
sults in ineffective service and any default judgment based upon it is inva-
lid.62 The court reviewed a clerk's noncompliance with this requirement in
ISO Production Management 1982, Ltd. v. M & L Oil & Gas Exploration,
55. See Citizens Nat'l Bank-Ennis v. Hart, 321 S.W.2d 319, 320 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1959, writ ref'd); Gentry v. Gentry, 550 S.W.2d 167, 167-168 (Fex. Civ. App.-Austin
1977, no writ); First Nat'l Bank v. Pacific Cotton Agency, 329 S.W.2d 504, 505-06 (rex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1959, no writ).
56. 774 S.W.2d at 65.
57. Id. at 65; accord Zaragoza v. De La Paz Morales, 616 S.W.2d 295, 296 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Midwest Piping & Supply Co. v. Page, 128 S.W.2d
459, 461-62 (rex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1939, writ ref'd).
58. 770 S.W.2d at 17.
59. Id. at 17.
60. Id. at 17-18.
61. TEX. R. CIV. P. 101 (repealed Jan. 1, 1988). The same requirement has been incor-
porated in TEX. R. CIV. P. 99.
62. See, ag., Lemothe v. Cimbalista, 236 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio
[Vol. 44
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Inc..63 The plaintiff sued a limited partnership in its assumed name and,
after service was effected, obtained a default judgment. The clerk, however,
had directed the citation to the individual who was alleged in the petition to
be the president of the corporate general partner, and service was effected on
this basis. Emphasizing that the defendant partnership had been sued in its
assumed name, the appellate court concluded that the partnership had to be
cited in the same fashion in order for the rule to be satisfied and set aside the
default judgment.64
IV. PLEADINGS
Recently enacted Rule 1365, which is aimed at deterring the filing of frivo-
lous pleadings,66 was the subject of judicial scrutiny during the survey pe-
riod.67 Rule 13 provides that the signatures of attorneys or parties on a
court filing certify that they have read it and that the filing "is not ground-
less and brought in bad faith or groundless and brought for the purpose of
harassment."'68 "'Groundless', for purposes of the rule, means no basis in
law or fact and not warranted by good faith argument for the extension,
modification or reversal of existing law."'69 If a party or attorney signs a
filing in violation of the rule, "the court, upon motion or upon its own initia-
tive, shall impose sanctions... upon the person who signed it, a represented
party, or both."70 Since the trial court is clearly empowered to levy sanc-
tions on its own motion and the rule does not provide for advance notice to
the offending party, Goad v. Goad 71 held that prior notice is not required.
Notably, under Rule 13 a trial court may not impose sanctions except for
good cause and, if imposed, the court must set forth the particulars of the
1951, writ ref'd); Stafford Constr. Co. v. Martin, 531 S.W.2d 667, 668-70 (Tex. Civ. App-El
Paso 1975, no writ).
63. 768 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. App.-Waco 1989, no writ).
64. Id. at 356.
65. TEX. R. CIV. P. 13.
66. See generally Benedetto & Keltner, Changes in Pleading Practices (Including the Friv-
olous Suit Question), 1987 ST. MARY'S NINTH ANNUAL PROCEDURAL INSTITUTE:
CIVIL PROCEDURE 1988-RULES AND STATUTORY CHANGES F-2 to -12 (discuss-
ing legislative history, purpose, and effect of rule 13); Carlson, Procedural Changes Mandated
by the 1988 Rule Changes, 6 ADVOC. 22, 23 (1987) (discussing frivolous suit deterrence pur-
pose of rule 13).
67. See supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
68. TEX. R. CIV. P. 13; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (analogous federal rule regarding
signing of pleadings). See generally 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE §§ 1331-1335 (1969 & Supp. 1986)(discussing federal rule analogous to TEX.
R. CIV. P. 13).
69. TEX. R. CIV. P. 13. Two filings are, however, exempt from the scope of the amended
rule 13. Specifically, the rule provides that neither a general denial nor the amount requested
for damages in a pleading constitute a violation. Id.
70. TEX. R. CIV. P. 13. The trial court may impose sanctions against the offending party
which include disallowance of further discovery, assessment of discovery expenses or taxable
costs, establishment of designated facts, refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or
oppose claims or defenses, striking pleadings, dismissal of claims, rendition of a default judg-
ment, and contempt. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 215(2)(b) (miscellaneous sanctions), and TEX. R.
CIV. P. 215(2)(b)(8) (contempt).
71. 768 S.W.2d 356, 358 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, writ denied), cert denied,
U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 722, 107 L.Ed.2d 742 (1990).
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good cause in its sanctions order.72 Despite this admonition in the rule, one
case during the survey period held that the failure of the trial court to recite
facts in its order constituting good cause was not fatal to a levy of sanctions,
as it was harmless error.7 3 The better practice, however, would be for the
trial court to specify the factual basis for good cause which supports its sanc-
tion order.74
Rule 13 loses some effectiveness since it further provides that a trial court
may not impose sanctions if, before the earliest of either the 90th day after
the court determines a violation or prior to the expiration of the trial court's
plenary power, the offending party withdraws or amends the filing to the
satisfaction of the court." Focusing on this aspect of the rule, one court
during the survey period held that the rule did not impose on the trial court
the burden of notifying the litigant of his right to withdraw or amend the
offending pleading.7 6
The most significant interpretation of rule 13 during the survey period,
Powers v. Palacios,7 7 construed the remedial procedure of withdrawal or
amendment. Faced with the likelihood of a summary judgment on her dog
bite claim, the plaintiff nonsuited the claim shortly prior to a hearing on the
matter. Before the nonsuit was entered, however, the defendant filed a mo-
tion for sanctions under Rule 13 and, after the dismissal, the defendant pur-
sued her motion. On the basis of this motion, the trial court ordered the
imposition of sanctions. Thereafter, arguing that the trial court had no
power to act with respect to the motion, the plaintiff prosecuted an appeal
from the order. Relying on Rule 162, which states that a nonsuit "shall have
no effect on any motion for sanctions ... pending at the time of the dismis-
sal,''Ts the appellate court affirmed, ruling that the trial court retained juris-
diction to dispose of the defendant's motion for sanctions. 79
One court addressed the issue of whether a general prayer for relief can
sustain the award of prejudgment interest.80 A petition in a Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices Act case, which contained only a general prayer for relief,
was held in Wise v. DeTocas1 not to authorize an award of prejudgment
interest. The Wise decision, however, should be considered in light of other
cases that have held, when prejudgment interest is permitted by contract or
72. TEX. R. CIV. P. 13.
73. See Powers v. Palacios, 771 S.W.2d 716, 718-19 (rex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989,
writ denied).
74. See Cloughly v. NBC Bank-Seguin, 773 S.W.2d 652, 656-57 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1989, writ denied).
75. Id.
76. 773 S.W.2d at 657.
77. 771 S.W.2d at 716.
78. TEX. R. CIV. P. 162.
79. 771 S.W.2d at 718.
80. Wise v. DeToca, 761 S.W.2d 467, 470 (rex. App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1988, no
writ).
81. 761 S.W.2d at 470. Accord Texas Indus., Inc. v. Lucas, 715 S.W.2d 683, 686-88 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dawson V. Garcia, 666 SW.2d 254, 267-
68 (Tex. App.-Daflas 1984, no writ).
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statute, that a petition containing a general prayer for relief is sufficient.8 2
V. DISQUALIFICATION
A. Disqualification of Judges
The use of assigned or visiting judges to hear pretrial matters or to preside
over trials has generated its own body of case law in the disqualification area.
The legislature recently amended the Texas Government Code to permit a
litigant to disqualify an assigned or visiting judge, provided an objection is
"filed before the first hearing or trial, including pretrial hearings, over which
the assigned judge is to preside."'8 3 In Lewis v. Leftwich84 upon receiving
notice that the case would be tried before an assigned judge beginning that
afternoon, counsel for one of the litigants filed a written objection to the
assignment and then appeared at the docket call to present the matter. At
the behest of the opposing party, the assigned judge overruled the objection
as being untimely, presumably because it was not presented at an earlier
conference in the judge's chambers. Reversing, the court of appeals held
that an objection is timely if it is made in open court before the assigned
judge calls the case to hearing or trial.85 The court stated that a litigant need
not risk wasting his one objection to an assigned judge by presenting it pre-
maturely.86 Rather, observed the court, it is only when an assigned judge
has actually taken the bench and called the case to trial as a matter of rec-
ord, that it is clear that the assigned judge will hear the trial, and only then
can a litigant planning to object be assured that his objection will be effec-
tive.87 Finally, the court concluded that, once a litigant files an objection to
an assigned judge in accordance with the applicable statute, the trial judge is
automatically disqualified as a matter of law.88
Money v. Jones89 is a warning that the requirement that an objection to a
visiting judge be made before the first hearing must be strictly followed.
When the plaintiff's attorney learned that a visiting judge would hear his
case when it went to trial, the attorney appeared before the judge with a
written motion for continuance and made an oral motion to excuse the visit-
ing judge. The trial judge stated that, if a written objection to his sitting was
filed, he would excuse himself. Moreover, when the judge asked the attorney
82. See Sanchez v. Matthews, 636 S.W.2d 455, 461 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1982, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Arndt v. National Supply Co., 633 S.W.2d 919, 924 (rex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Allison, 620 S.W.2d 207, 212
(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler, 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 624 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. 1981); Golden v.
Murphy, 611 S.W.2d 914, 917 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ). See also
Republic Nat'l Bank v. Northwest Natl Bank, 578 S.W.2d 109, 117 (Tex. 1978) (prejudgment
interest recoverable as matter of right when ascertainable sum of money is determined to have
been due and payable at date certain prior to judgment).
83. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 74.053(c) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
84. 775 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
85. Id. at 850.
86. Id. at 850.
87. Id. at 850.
88. Leftwich, 775 S.W.2d at 851.
89. 766 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
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if he wanted to file such an objection, the attorney responded that he would
reserve his right to do so but wanted to proceed on his motion for continu-
ance. When the judge proceeded with a hearing on the request for continu-
ance and overruled it, the attorney refused to go forward with the trial and
the trial judge dismissed the plaintiff's suit. On an appeal from the dismis-
sal, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's actions, concluding that the
plaintiff had waived his objection to the visiting judge by not presenting it
before the hearing on the motion for continuance. 90
Rule 18a,91 which governs the disqualification of judges for cause, pro-
vides that a party may file a motion for disqualification at least ten days
before the date set for trial.92 Before proceedings in the case can continue,
the judge to whom the motion is directed must either excuse himself or refer
the motion to the presiding judge of the district for determination. 93 In
Lamberti v. Tschoepe 94 the court held that when a trial judge is presented
with such a recusal motion, regardless of its sufficiency, it is mandatory that
the judge either recuse himself or refer the case to the presiding judge.95 The
failure or the trial judge to pursue one of these two courses of action consti-
tutes an abuse of discretion as a matter of law. 96
B Disqualification of Counsel
Satellite skirmishes in civil litigation continue to occur over the disqualifi-
cation of counsel. NCNB Texas National Bank v. Coker,97 a recent decision
of the Texas Supreme Court, dealt with one such situation. The plaintiff
bank sought to recover from the two defendants funds allegedly due it on
credit insurance policies. Counsel for the bank, however, had previously
represented the two defendants in an earlier suit that they had brought
against an insurance company seeking a declaration of rights under certain
insurance treaties between the parties. Canon 9 of the Texas Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility mandates that lawyers avoid any activity that might
give rise to an appearance of impropriety.98 Canon 4 imposes on lawyers the
duty to preserve the confidences of their clients, both present and former.99
Relying on the combined effect of these two canons, the defendants obtained
the disqualification in the trial court of the bank's counsel.
On review of the matter by mandamus, the supreme court reiterated that,
before disqualifying counsel in a suit brought against a former client, the
90. Id. at 308.
91. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a.
92. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(a).
93. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(c), (d).
94. 776 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ requested).
* 95. Id. at 652; accord Greenberg, Benson, Fisk & Fiedler, P.C. v. Howell, 685 S.W.2d
694, 695 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
96. 776 S.W.2d at 652.
97. 765 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. 1989).
98. SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, RULES GOVERNING THE STATE BAR OF
TEXAS art. X, § 9 (Code of Professional Responsibility) DR 2-101 (Vernon Supp. 1990)
[hereinafter TEXAS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSInLrrY].
99. TEXAS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY at § 4.
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trial court must find that the matters embraced within the pending suit are
substantially related to the factual matters in the prior representation.100
Furthermore, focusing on the movant's burden in such a situation, the court
concluded that given the severity of the remedy, the movant has to establish
by a preponderance of the facts the substantial relationship between the two
representations. 101 If the movant can meet this burden, concluded the court,
the movant is entitled to a conclusive presumption that confidences relevant
to the subject matter of the pending suit were imparted to the former counsel
and, accordingly, the movant is not forced to reveal the very confidences he
wishes to protect. 10 2 By proving a substantial relationship between the two
representations, the court reasoned that the party establishes as a matter of
law that an appearance of impropriety exists and counsel must be disquali-
fied. 103 Turning to the record before it and focusing on the trial court's
order of disqualification, the supreme court concluded that the substantial
relation test had not been followed and held that the trial court's use of an
improper legal standard was an abuse of discretion.°4
VI. PARTIES
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42 provides that one or more members of a
class may sue on behalf of the entire class if, among other things, the claims
of the representative parties are typical of the claims of the class and the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class. 105 The case of Texas Department of Mental Health & Mental Retarda-
tion v. Petty 10 6 is informative in its interpretation of these requirements. The
trial court, in a suit seeking to modify the state's involuntary commitment
procedure brought by a mental patient and a non-profit corporation formed
to advocate the interests of mentally ill persons, approved the corporation as
a representative of the class. On an interlocutory appeal from the order cer-
tifying the class, the court stated that, since the corporation was neither ag-
grieved by the challenged procedure nor composed of members who were, it
lacked standing to pursue a claim against the state agency and, therefore,
possessed no claims typical of the class. 10 7 Moreover, since the corporation
occupied the dual role of class representative and, through its fbll-time legal
staff, was appearing as counsel of record and seeking the recovery of attor-
100. 765 S.W.2d at 400; accord, P & M Elec. Co. v. Godard, 478 S.W.2d 79, 80-81 (Trex.
1972); Hogard v. Snodgrass, 770 S.W.2d 577, 582 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ); J.K. &
Susie L. Wadley Research & Blood Bank v. Morris, 776 S.W.2d 271, 278 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1989, no writ); Enstar Petroleum Co. v. Mancias, 773 S.W.2d 662, 664 (Tex. App.--San
Antonio 1989 mand. overr.); Lott v. Lott, 605 S.W.2d 665, 667-68 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1980, writ dism'd).
101. Coker, 765 S.W.2d at 400; accord Snodgrass, 770 S.W.2d at 582.
102. Coker, 765 S.W.2d at 400; accord Morris, 770 S.W.2d at 281; see Godard, 478 S.W.2d
at 78, 80-81.
103. Coker, 765 S.W.2d at 400; accord Snodgrass, 770 S.W.2d at 582-83.
104. Coker, 765 S.W.2d at 400.
105. TEX. R. CIV. P. 42
106. 778 S.W.2d 156 (rex. App.-Austin, 1989, writ requested).
107. Id. at 164-65.
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ney's fees, the court concluded it had a conflict of interest.'0 8
Specifically, the court noted that any attorney acting simultaneously as a
class representative and as class counsel has an inherent conflict of interest
due to his duty as representative and his economic interest in his attorney's
fees. The court concluded, therefore, that the corporation could not satisfy
the adequacy requirement to becoming a representative.109 Based on both
grounds, the court vacated the trial court's order insofar as it allowed the
corporation to serve as a class representative. 0
Tarrant County Commissioners Court v. Markham"' also focused on the
requirement that the class representative have a personal stake in the out-
come of the controversy. The plaintiff, a former pretrial detainee who was
incarcerated briefly in the county jail, filed a class action complaining of the
conditions in the jail. After the trial court certified the class, approving the
plaintiff as its representative, an interlocutory appeal of the matter was
taken. Emphasizing that the plaintiff had been released from jail by the time
suit was filed, the court concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue
since he was not affected by the jail's conditions at the time suit was
brought. "12
Finally, Express-News Corp. v. Spears11 3 considered an unusual set of pro-
cedural events. After entry of a final judgment and an order sealing the
record in a well-publicized suit, a newspaper, one of its reporters, and a local
taxpayer sought to intervene, presumably to unseal the record. After the
trial court struck their intervention, the plaintiffs filed a mandamus proceed-
ing with the court of appeals seeking reversal of the trial court's action.
Finding their attempted intervention to be untimely, the court held that the
plaintiffs could not intervene after entry of the judgmdent. 1 4
VII. VENUE
Two cases decided during the survey period addressed the mandatory
venue provision for suits involving real property.1 5 In Trafalgar House Oil
& Gas Ina v. De Hinojosa " 6 the plaintiff sued for liquidated damages alleg-
ing that defendants had breached the notice of assignment provision in an oil
and gas lease. Because the lease provided that all payments due to plaintiff
would be made in Jim Wells County, plaintiff filed his suit in that county on
108. Id. at 167.
109. Id. at 167-68.
110. Petty, 778 S.W.2d at 168.
111. 779 S.W.2d 872 (rex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, writ requested).
112. Id. at 875. The court also admonished the trial court for certifying a larger class than
the plaintiff sought in his pleadings, so as to include former inmates and thereby avoid the
defect in standing. Id. at 876. Striking down the unsupported order, the court held that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue such a ruling. Id. at 876; see Birds Constr., Inc. v.
Gonzales, 595 S.W.2d 926, 929 (rex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ).
113. 766 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, mand. overr.) (2-1 decision).
114. Id. at 888; accord First Alief Bank v. White, 682 S.W.2d 251, 252 (rex. 1984); Comal
County Rural High School Dist. v. Nelson, 158 Tex. 564, 314 S.W.2d 956, 957 (1958).
115. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.011 (Vernon 1986).
116. 773. S.W.2d 797 (rex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ).
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the basis of § 15.035(a) of the venue statute. 117 In their motion to transfer,
defendants contended that venue was mandatory in the county where the
lease was located pursuant to § 15.011,11s because the case involved an ac-
tion to recover an interest in real property. The court of appeals disagreed,
holding that the suit was a breach of contract action to recover liquidated
damages rather than an action to recover land or quiet title.119 According to
the court, the ultimate or dominant purpose of the suit determines whether
the case falls under § 15.011.120 Because § 15.011 must be strictly construed
due to its mandatory nature, the court held further that it should not be
applied when a suit does not fall clearly within one of the categories specified
by the statute. 121
Likewise, in Stiba v. Bowers 122, the court refused to apply § 15.011 in a
declaratory judgment suit seeking the construction of a will and an account-
ing. The plaintiff in Stiba had filed his suit in the county where the will was
originally probated. Although the decedent's estate consisted primarily of
real property that was also located in the county of suit, the court concluded
that the dominant purpose of the suit was for the construction of the will
and not for the recovery of the land forming the corpus of the decedent's
estate. 123 The court did acknowledge, however, that a suit could be gov-
erned by § 15.011 in an appropriate case even though it was cast as a declar-
atory judgment action. 124
The court in Stiba also rejected plaintiff's alternative contention that
venue was proper in the county of suit because the will had been probated in
that county.125 Relying on the general venue rule, 126 plaintiff argued that
the cause of action accrued in the county of suit because the act of probating
the will was part of the cause of action for its construction. According to the
court, however, probate is merely a part of the process by which courts rec-
ognize the validity of a will, and the probating of a will is not a part of the
cause of action for its construction. 127
117. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.035(a) (Vernon 1986) provides: "[I]f
a person has contracted in writing to perform an obligation in a particular county, expressly
naming the county or a definite place in that county by that writing, suit on or by reason of the
obligation may be brought against him either in that county or in the county in which the
defendant has his domicile."
118. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.011 (Vernon 1986) provides that
certain actions involving real property, including an action for recovery of an interest in real
property, shall be brought in the county in which all or part of the property is located.
119. 773 S.W.2d at 798.
120. Id. (citing Scarth v. First Bank & Trust Co., 711 S.W.2d 140, 142 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1986, no writ)).
121. Id. at 798.
122. 756 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).
123. Id. at 840.
124. Id. at 839.
125. Id.
126. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.001 (Vernon 1986) provides generally
that a lawsuit may be brought in the county in which all or part of the cause of action accrued
or in the county of defendant's residence if defendant is a natural person.
127. 756 S.W.2d at 837.
1990]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
On its face, Krchnak v. Fulton 128 appears to expand the venue rules for
suits on contracts. As previously noted, § 15.035(a) of the venue statute per-
mits suits on written contracts to be filed in any county expressly named in
the contract as the site for performance of the obligations due under the
contract.1 29 In Krchnak the plaintiff was unable to take advantage of this
provision because, apparently, no written contract existed between the par-
ties. Nevertheless, in opposing defendant's motion to transfer venue to the
county of defendant's residence, plaintiff contended by affidavit that the de-
fendant had orally agreed to make payment in the county of suit. The court
observed that payment in the county of suit was an essential part of the
cause of action for breach of contract.1 30 Since defendant failed to make the
required payment, therefore, a portion of the cause of action accrued in the
county of suit and venue was proper there in accordance with § 15.001.131
VIII. LIMITATIONS
The discovery rule provides that the statute of limitations will not start
running until the plaintiff discovers the true facts giving rise to his claimed
damage or until the date the plaintiff should have reasonably discerned the
facts that establish the cause of action.132 In Woods v. William M. Mercer,
Inc.133 the supreme court acknowledged that some of its prior decisions
about the rule have been inconsistent, thereby creating confusion about the
rule's application.134 Attempting to end at least part of this confusion, the
court in Woods held that the discovery rule is a plea in confession and avoid-
ance.135 A party seeking to avail itself of the discovery rule, therefore,
waives the plea if it fails to plead the required facts affirmatively. 136 Since
that same party generally has greater access to the facts necessary to estab-
lish the rule's application, the court further held that the party asserting the
discovery rule bears the burden at trial of proving the plea and securing
128. 759 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, writ denied).
129. See supra note 3.
130. 759 S.W.2d at 526, (citing Phillio v. Blythe, 12 Tex. 124, 127-28 (1854)).
131. 759 S.W.2d at 526. The court distinguished an earlier venue statute which provided
that suit was maintainable in the county in which the cause of action arose, and thereby im-
plied, without elaboration, that there is a difference between that standard and the standard for
determining the county in which a cause of action accrued. Id.
132. See, ag., Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412, 414 (rex. 1972) (statute of limitations begins
to run from time of discovery of true facts or from date they should, using ordinary care and
diligence, have been discovered); Anderson v. Sneed, 615 S.W.2d 898, 901 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1981, no writ) (utilizing discovery rule to determine when case of action accrued). See
generally Figari, Graves & Gordon, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 36
Sw. L.J. 435, 450 (1982) (discussing discovery rule generally).
133. 769 S.W.2d 515 (rex. 1988)
134. Id. at 517. Compare Weaver v. Witt, 561 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Tex. 1977) (discovery rule
"is not a plea in confession and avoidance.. .") with Smith v. Knight, 608 S.W.2d 165, 166
(rex. 1980) (discovery rule is "an affirmative defense to the statute of limitations.").
135. 769 S.W.2d at 517. A plea in confession and avoidance is one which avows and con-
fesses the truth of the averments of fact in the petition, but then proceeds to allege a new
matter which tends to deprive those facts of their ordinary legal effect, or to obviate, neutral-
ize, or avoid them. BLACK'S LAW DICrMONARY 269 (5th ed. 1979).
136. 769 S.W.2d at 518.
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favorable findings thereon.1 37 For purposes of rule 279,138 moreover, the
discovery rule is an independent ground of defense with but a single ele-
ment.139 Consequently, the plaintiff's failure to request an appropriate jury
issue relating to the discovery rule in Woods was not excused by his opposi-
tion's failure to point out that omission to the trial court by objection."4°
The plaintiff's attempt to rely on a variation of the discovery rule in
Lathem v. Richey 141 met with a similar lack of success. More than four
years after deeding certain property to the defendant, plaintiff filed suit to
reform the deed on the basis of mutual mistake. In response to the defend-
ant's argument that the four-year statute of limitations applicable to suits for
reformation of a deed barred the claim,142 the plaintiff alleged that he did
not discover the mistake until less than four years before he filed the suit. In
rejecting plaintiff's contention, 143 the court of appeals acknowledged that
the statute of limitations generally does not begin to run in a suit for refor-
mation on the basis of mutual mistake until the mistake has been discovered
or until it reasonably should have been discovered by a person of ordinary
care through the exercise of due diligence. 14 The court observed, however,
that an exception to this general rule exists if the person seeking reformation
is the grantor of the deed. 145 In such cases, absent fraud, the statute of limi-
tations begins to run from the date of the deed's execution because a grantor
is charged as a matter of law with the contents of his deed from the date it is
executed.' 46 The court also held that the statute of limitations barred plain-
tiff's alternative claim for reformation on the basis of fraud, which plaintiff
had added by amendment ten years after commencement of the suit.1 47 Ac-
cording to the court, the amended pleading did not relate back148 to the
original pleading for the purpose of tolling the statute of limitations since the
cause of action initially asserted by plaintiff was itself barred by limitations
when the original pleading was filed. 149
During the survey period, courts again focused their scrutiny on the limi-
137. Id. In the summary judgment context, on the other hand, the burden rests on the
movant-defendant to negate the discovery rule. Id. at 518 n. 2, citing, Weaver v. Witt, 561
S.W.2d 792, 794 (Tex. 1977).
138. TEX. R. CIV. P. 279.
139. 769 S.W.2d at 518.
140. Id.
141. 772 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
142. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.051 (Vernon 1986); Miles v. Mar-
tin, 159 Tex. 336, 321 S.W.2d 62, 69-70 (1959).
143. 772 S.W.2d at 253.
144. 772 S.W.2d at 253 (citing Sullivan v. Barnett, 471 S.W.2d 39, 46 (Tex. 1971)).
145. 772 S.W.2d at 253.
146. The court noted that under various circumstances the presumption that a grantor has
immediate knowledge of a mistake in a deed is rebuttable. Id.
147. 772 S.W.2d at 255.
148. Id. at 255. Under the "relation back" doctrine, TEX CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 16.068 (Vernon 1986), if a filed pleading relates to a claim that is not barred by
limitations when the pleading is filed, an amendment to that pleading which changes the facts
or grounds of liability is not subject to a plea of limitation unless the amendment is wholly
based upon a new, distinct, or different transaction or occurrence.
149. 772 S.W.2d at 255.
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tations provision contained in the Texas health care statute. 150 The supreme
court, for example, in what is becoming an annual tradition, addressed a
constitutional issue raised by the statute. 151 In Hellman v. Mateo1 52 the
court held that a plaintiff preserved her right to challenge the constitutional-
ity of article 4590i, as applied to her, by alleging that application of the two-
year limitation statute cut off her cause of action before she knew or should
have known that a cause of action existed.' 53
A more extensive treatment of the statute appeared in the Amarillo court
of appeals' opinion in Rhodes v. McCarron.154 The plaintiff in Rhodes un-
derwent surgery in late July, 1984, for leg injuries he suffered in an automo-
bile accident. Approximately one year later he learned about additional
injuries resulting from the accident that had not been diagnosed or treated
while he was originally hospitalized. After making this discovery, the plain-
tiff duly sent the prescribed notice' 55 of a health care liability claim to the
physicians who treated him. Subsequently, plaintiff filed a suit against those
physicians. As a result of discovery proceedings in the suit, the plaintiff
learned in late August, 1986, that yet another physician, McCarron, had
participated in his original treatment. Accordingly, in early September the
plaintiff sent a notice of claim letter to McCarron, and two months later he
joined McCarron as a defendant in the suit. Ultimately, the trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of McCarron on the basis that plain-
tiff's claim against McCarron was barred by limitations.' 5 6
On appeal, plaintiff argued that his notice to the original defendants tolled
the statute of limitations for 75 days, which enlarged the limitations period
to mid-October, 1986. Since the plaintiff discovered McCarron's involve-
ment during this period of time, the plaintiff contended that his second no-
tice sent to McCarron was timely and tolled the statute for an additional
seventy-five days for purposes of joining McCarron as a defendant. Section
4.01(c) of the statute, however, provides that delivery of the required sixty-
day notice will toll the statute of limitations for a period of seventy-five days
as to all potential, as well as actual, parties to the suit.'5 7 Thus, while the
court agreed that plaintiff's original notice enlarged by seventy-five days the
limitations period within which McCarron could be joined as a defendant,' 58
plaintiff could not, by sending a second notice directly to McCarron, further
expand the period in which McCarron could be joined.15 9 The plaintiff's
150. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (two-year
statute of limitations on health care claims).
151. Hellman v. Mateo, 772 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. 1989).
152. 772 S.W.2d 64 (rex. 1989)
153. Id. at 66.
154. 763 S.W.2d 518 (rex. App.-Amarillo 1988, writ denied).
155. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 4.01 (Vernon Supp. 1990), which
provides that any person asserting a health care liability claim shall give written notice of his
claim to each health care provider that he is asserting a claim against at least 60 days before he
files a suit based on the claim.
156. 763 S.W.2d at 521.
157. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art 4590i § 4.01(c) (Vernon Supp. 1990).




reasoning, observed the court, would permit a clever plaintiff to carefully
space his notice letters and thereby extend the two-year limitations period
for as many additional seventy-five-day periods as there were defendants. 160
The court likewise rejected plaintiff's constitutional challenge to the stat-
ute.161 According to the plaintiff, the summary judgment was improper
under the supreme court's holding in Morrison v. Chan 162 because a material
issue of fact existed as to whether he had a reasonable opportunity to dis-
cover McCarron's alleged negligeno within the two-year period of limita-
tions. The court of appeals conclude , however, that Morrison declared the
statute unconstitutional only to the extent it was applied to cut off a litigant's
cause of action before he had a reasonable opportunity to discover the wrong
and bring suit.163 The statute was not unconstitutional as applied to the
plaintiff then, because he discovered his injury more than a year before limi-
tations ran on his action against McCarron.164 The court held that plain-
tiff's reliance on fraudulent concealment was equally misplaced. 165
According to the court, any duty McCarron had under the statute to dis-
close the injury ceased once the physician-patient relationship terminated. 166
Because there was no evidence that this relationship continued beyond Au-
gust 4, 1984, nor was there any evidence McCarron had actual knowledge of
the injury and had a fixed purpose to conceal it, plaintiff could not rely on
fraudulent concealment as a basis for extending the limitation's cut-off.167
IX. DISCOVERY
A. Discovery Procedures
Any trial practitioner who drafts Rule 167168 document requests should
review the supreme court's opinion in Loftin v. Martin. 69 In that manda-
mus proceeding, the defendant had served a request for production of docu-
ments that sought, among other things, all documents that the plaintiff
contended supported its cause of action. The plaintiff objected to this re-
quest on the basis that it was so vague, broad, and unclear that the plaintiff
160. Id.
161. Id. at 523.
162. 699 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. 1985).
163. 763 S.W.2d at 523.
164. Id. In so holding, the court observed that § 10.01 withstood the constitutional attack
launched in Morrison because the plaintiff there discovered her injury approximately eighteen
months before the limitations period expired. Id. See Morrison, 699 S.W.2d at 207.
165. 763 S.W.2d at 523-24. Fraudulent concealment estops a defendant, with an undis-
charged duty of disclosure, from relying on limitations until the plaintiff learns or, through the
exercise of reasonable diligence, should have learned of his right of action. See Borderlon v.
Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907, 908 (rex. 1983).
166. 763 S.W.2d at 524 (citing Borderlon, 661 S.W.2d at 910 (Barrow, J., dissenting)).
167. 763 S.W.2d at 524. The court also rejected plaintiff's contention that McCarron's
absence from the state tolled the limitations statute, holding that TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 16.063 was expressly inapplicable to medical malpractice claims. Id.; see Hill
v. Milani, 686 S.W.2d 610, 611 (Tex. 1985), discussed in 1986 Annual Survey, supra note 119,
at 502.
168. TEX. R. CIV. P. 167.
169. 776 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1989).
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could not determine with reasonable certainty the documents it was being
called on to produce. The supreme court agreed with this characteriza-
tion.170 According to the court, Rule 167 permits a party to request particu-
lar classes or types of documents in a request for production, but, unlike
interrogatories and depositions, may not be used simply to explore. 171
Two other cases of interest involving written discovery requests that were
decided during the Survey period were County of Dallas v. Harrison,172 and
Benger Builders, Inc. v. Business Credit Leasing, Inc.173 In Harrison, the
court held that a Rule 167 request for production of all photographs to be
used at trial did not include a request for production of videotape record-
ings. 174 The court based its conclusion on the fact that Rule 166b(2)(6), 17s
which defines the scope of discovery for documents and tangible things, 176
differentiates between photographs and videotapes. 177 In Benger Builders,
the court provided guidance on the interplay of the various procedural rules
for computing time in connection with responses to requests for admis-
sions. 178 Specifically, the court concluded that Rule 21a, 179 providing an
additional three days to any time period where service is made by mail, and
Rule 4,180 extending the period for timely filing of a pleading to the next day
that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, are both applicable to re-
quests for admissions.' 8 ' Thus, under the circumstances presented in Benger
Builders, the answering party actually had thirty-five days in which to re-
spond to the requests for admissions.18 2
Finally, two cases decided during the survey period addressed the issue of
where a party may take depositions. The first, WalMart Stores, Inc. v.
Street,18 3 added the latest chapter in the continuing saga of a plaintiff's ef-
forts to depose Sam Walton, the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc.. As readers of the 1989 Annual Survey will recall, the
supreme court previously held that the trial judge's order requiring Walton,
a resident of Arkansas, to give his deposition in Fort Worth constituted an
abuse of discretion. 84 Following that ruling, the trial court ordered, with
the parties' agreement, that the deposition take place at the defendant's
170. Id. at 148.
171. Id., (quoting Steely & Gayle, Operation of the Discovery Rules, 2 HousroN L. REv.
222, 223 (1964)). See also Lunsmann v. Spector, 761 S.W.2d 112, 113-14 (Fex. App.-San
Antonio 1988, no writ) (interrogatory asking for any information associated with "this cause
of action" was overly broad).
172. 759 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
173. 764 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
174. 759 S.W.2d at 531.
175. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166b(2)(6).
176. Id.
177. Harrison, 759 S.W.2d at 531.
178. Benger Builders, 764 S.W.2d at 337-38.
179. TEX. R. CIV. P. 21a.
180. TEX. R. CIV. P. 4.
181. 764 S.W.2d at 338.
182. Id. at 337-38.
183. 761 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, mand. over.).
184. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Street, 754 S.W.2d 153, 155 (rex. 1988).
[Vol. 44
TEX4S CIVIL PROCEDURE
headquarters in Bentonville, Arkansas. Ins Prior to the deposition, however,
Walton sought and obtained a protective order from an Arkansas court,
moving the situs of the deposition to the courthouse in Bentonville, which
was approximately one mile from the defendant's headquarters. 18 6 The
plaintiff's attorney refused to travel to the courthouse and moved instead for
sanctions. The trial court granted this motion, entered a default judgment as
to liability, and ordered the defendant to produce Walton in the courthouse
in Fort Worth for his deposition.18 7 In the event the defendant failed to
produce Walton, the trial court ordered that additional sanctions would be
imposed each day, with the sanctions eventually reaching the level of
$1,000,000 per day.' 88
On petition for writ of mandamus filed by the defendant, the court of
appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Wal-
ton to give his deposition in Fort Worth.189 The court stated that neither
the Texas procedural rules nor the supreme court's prior decision in this
controversy granted Walton an absolute right to be deposed in the county of
his residence or business. 190 Instead, the court noted that Rule 201(5)191
provides that, apart from those customary locales, a deposition may also be
held at such other convenient place as may be directed by the court. 192 Un-
like the trial court's prior order, the court of appeals concluded that the
record now supported a finding that Fort Worth was a reasonable and con-
venient place to take the deposition. 193 The court based this conclusion on
facts that the trial court judicially noticed regarding Walton's contacts with
Texas, 194 as well as Walton's interference with the previously agreed-upon
deposition. 19s
In contrast to Wal-Mart Stores, the court of appeals in Borden, Ina v.
Valdez,196 found no reasonable basis for ordering that the deposition of a
third-party witness, an attorney, be held in a county other than that in which
he resided and conducted his business. 197 In Borden no agreement existed
between the parties to take the deposition elsewhere, and no other evidence
presented showed that it was reasonable for the deponent to travel to the
county selected by the court. Based upon these facts the court held that the
deposition should have been conducted in the county where the witness
185. 761 S.W.2d at 589.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 589.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 590-91. Because an adequate remedy on appeal was available to the defendant,
with respect to the sanctions imposed by the trial court, the court of appeals held that manda-
mus was not available to challenge that aspect of the order. Id. at 589.
190. Id. at 591.
191. TEX. R. CIV. P. 201(5).
192. 761 S.W.2d at 591.
193. Id. at 590.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. 773 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1989, no writ).




B. Privileges and Exemptions
Rule 166(3)(d) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure exempts from dis-
covery communications between agents or representatives of a party that are
made subsequent to the events upon which suit is based and in anticipation
of the prosecution or defense of the claims made a part of the pending litiga-
tion.199 The Texas Supreme Court has construed this exemption to apply
only in those cases in which the communication is made after suit is filed or
after good cause exists to believe suit will be filed. 20o In Flores v. Fourth
Court of Appeals, 20 1 the court tried to provide guidance in the interpretation
of this test.202
Mores arose from a worker's compensation suit against the City of San
Antonio. The City objected to producing a report prepared by a claims su-
pervisor employed by an independent adjusting firm hired by the City. The
supervisor prepared the report after the plaintiff filed his claim for compen-
sation with the Industrial Accident Board, but before the Board held a hear-
ing on such claim. The trial court ordered the report produced, 203 but the
court of appeals conditionally granted the City's writ of mandamus and di-
rected the trial judge to vacate his order.2°4 The supreme court, with three
justices dissenting, held that the court of appeals abused its discretion 2°5 and
that the trial court's order requiring production of the report should be
reinstated. 20 6
The court first rejected the City's contention that the plaintiff's filing of a
claim with the Industrial Accident Board constituted the commencement of
litigation for purposes of Rule 166b(3)(d). 207 The court then enunciated a
two-prong analysis for determining whether there is good cause to believe a
suit will be filed.208 The first prong is an objective one, wherein the court
gives consideration to outward manifestations that indicated litigation was
imminent.20 9 The second prong is subjective: did the party opposing discov-
ery have a good faith belief that a lawsuit was forthcoming. 210 A proponent
must meet both prongs of this test to establish the existence of good cause to
believe a suit will be filed.211 Using this analysis, the court concluded that
the report in question was prepared in the usual and customary course of the
198. Id.
199. TEX R. CIV. P. 166b(3)(d).
200. See, eg., Stringer v. Eleventh Court of Appeals, 720 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Tex. 1986);
Allen v. Humphreys, 559 S.W.2d 798, 803 (rex. 1977).
201. 777 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. 1989).
202. Id. at 3942.
203. Id. at 39.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 42.
206. Id.
207. 777 S.W.2d at 39-40.
208. Id. at 40-41.
209. Id.





As a postscript to its opinion, the majority in Fores encouraged the Texas
Bar to utilize the recently amended Rule 166b(3)(e)213 as a mechanism to
alleviate disputes over whether an investigation was undertaken in anticipa-
tion of litigation.214 That section provides that a party may obtain discovery
of otherwise exempt party communications upon a showing of substantial
need for the material and inability, without undue hardship, to obtain the
substantial equivalent by other means.215 Apparently, the majority did not
believe that this will be a difficult standard to meet.
Notwithstanding the supreme court's efforts, the lower courts have con-
tinued to struggle, both before and after Flores, with the question of whether
a party communication was made in anticipation of litigation. For example,
in Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Heard,216 the trial court ruled that the
defendant had not demonstrated good cause to believe a lawsuit would be
filed, despite the fact that the defendant had been advised that the survivor
of a car crash had hired an attorney and bought photographs of the acci-
dent.217 On petition for writ of mandamus, the court of appeals did not
express its view on whether the hiring of an attorney constituted a sufficient
outward manifestation of the likelihood of litigation, but instead stated that
the trial court's conclusion was not arbitrary or unreasonable and would not,
therefore, be disturbed.218 The Austin court of appeals reached a similar
result in Texas Department of Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Da-
vis. 219 There, the court applied the Flores two-part test220 and concluded
that the trial court's order requiring the disclosure of materials compiled by
the defendant's in-house counsel, in an investigation of the drowning death
of a resident of the Travis State School, was not an abuse of discretion.221
The court found that the mere subjective expectation that the accident
would give rise to litigation was not sufficient to prove good cause, even
though that expectation was subsequently borne out by the commencement
of an action.222
The attorney work product exemption from discovery was discussed in
Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Banale, 223 a case involving a video-
taped practice deposition. The trial court ordered the videotape produced
212. Id.
213. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166b(3)(e).
214. 777 S.W.2d at 42.
215. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166b(3)(e).
216. 774 S.W.2d 316 ('rex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, mand. over.).
217. Id. at 317.
218. Id. at 319.
219. 775 S.W.2d 467 ('ex. App.-Austin 1989, no writ).
220. Id. at 471-72.
221. Id. at 472.
222. Id. But see Smith v. Thornton, 765 S.W.2d 473, 477 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1988, writ requested) (upholding finding that materials compiled in investigation of acci-
dent were party communications exempt from discovery due to unusual nature of emergency
response and defendant's belief that there was potential for litigation).
223. 773 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, no writ).
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without having reviewed it in camera.224 The court of appeals held that this
was an abuse of discretion. 225 Because the objecting party specifically
pleaded the exemption relied upon, made a prima facie showing of its appli-
cation to the videotape, and tendered the tape for in camera inspection, the
court held that the trial judge should not have ordered the tape produced
without first reviewing it to see if it contained the type of information that
could be classified as work product.226
In Euresti v. Valdez,227 the court denied a petition for writ of mandamus
filed by the Cameron County Attorney that sought relief from an order com-
pelling him to produce, in a civil suit, the transcripts of testimony and
materials provided to a grand jury in a malicious prosecution action.228 The
plaintiff in Euresti alleged a particularized need for the material, and the trial
court concluded it should be produced. 229 The court of appeals applied the
well-established rule that a party claiming a privilege from discovery bears
the burden of proof on that issue230 to the County Attorney's claim that
grand jury materials were not discoverable.231 Thus, by failing to adduce
evidence that an investigation was ongoing, or that there would be some
damage to law enforcement efforts by the disclosure of the materials, the
County Attorney failed to discharge his burden of proof.232
Finally, the court in Public Utility Commission of Texas v. Houston Light-
ing & Power Co. 233 refused to find a waiver of the plaintiff utility company's
attorney-client privilege based on the company's filing of a rate case with the
Public Utility Commission. 234 The court distinguished those cases holding
that an offensive use of a claimed privilege results in a waiver of the privi-
lege,235 on the ground that the governing regulations required the company
to file a rate case any time it sought a rate increase. 236 Thus, the factual
justification for a finding an offensive waiver was lacking.237
C. Procedure for Claiming Privilege or Exemption
Continuing the trend of recent years, a number of decisions during the
survey period discussed the proper procedure for claiming privilege in the
discovery context, which was first outlined in Peeples v. Honorable Fourth
224. Id. at 693.
225. Id. at 694.
226. Id.
227. 769 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, no writ).
228. Id. at 579.
229. Id. at 577.
230. See Peeples v. Honorable Fourth Supreme Judicial Dist., 701 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex.
1985) (noting that burden of proof is on party asserting privilege).
231. 769 S.W.2d at 577.
232. Id. at 579.
233. 778 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, no writ).
234. Id. at 198-99.
235. See Ginsberg v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 686 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex. 1985); DeWitt &
Rearick, Inc. v. Ferguson, 699 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, no writ) (cases
holding that offensive use of privilege outside intended scope of privilege).
236. 778 S.W.2d at 198.
237. Id. at 199.
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Supreme Judicial DistrictM23 and subsequently codified in Rule 166b(4).239
The supreme court's opinion on rehearing in McKinney v. National Union
Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburg, Pa. 240 was the most significant of these
cases. In McKinney, the court, within the space of two months, announced
diametrically opposed rulings on the issue of which party has the burden of
obtaining a hearing on objections to discovery. 241 In its original opinion, the
court held that this burden fell on the objecting party. 242 On rehearing,
however, the Court reversed itself and placed the burden on the party seek-
ing discovery, 243 where it will now apparently stay.
The facts giving rise to this confusion in McKinney were as follows. The
plaintiff served on the defendant an interrogatory that requested the identity
and location of all persons with knowledge of relevant facts. Defendant ob-
jected to this inquiry on the grounds that it was overly broad and burden-
some. Neither party requested a hearing or obtained a ruling on this
objection. 244 At trial, however, the plaintiff objected to the defendant offer-
ing a witness who had not been designated in response to the discovery re-
quests. The trial court overruled this objection and allowed the witness to
testify.245
In its opinion on rehearing, the supreme court discussed the evolution
from Peeples, which required the objecting party to request a hearing on his
or her objections or risk waiving them,246 to Rule 166b(4),247 which permits
either party to request such a hearing.248 The court then determined that
the better practice under the current procedural rules would be to place the
responsibility for obtaining a hearing on discovery matters on the party re-
questing discovery.249 The court reasoned that the requesting party is in a
better position to determine the need for the information requested and, in
some instances, may recognize the validity of the resisting party's objec-
tion.250 Further, the court expressed its hope that the adoption of this pro-
cedure would encourage parties to work through discovery disputes without
judicial intervention whenever possible.251 Of course, if a hearing is re-
quested, the burden of establishing the privilege or immunity claimed will
still be on the objecting party. 252
The significance of this distinction between the burden of requesting a
238. 701 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. 1985).
239. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166b(4).
240. 772 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. 1989).
241. See McKinney, 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 306, 309 (April 5, 1989); McKinney, 772 S.W.2d at
75.
242. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 306 (April 5, 1989).
243. 772 S.W.2d at 75.
244. Id. at 74.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 74-75.
247. TEX. R. CIv. P. 166b(4).
248. 772 S.W.2d at 74-75 (citing Peeples, 701 S.W.2d at 637 and TEX. R. CIV. P. 166b(4)).






hearing and the ultimate burden of proof was illustrated in Lofin v. Mar-
tin,253 a case discussed in a previous section of this article.2 4 In Loftin, the
plaintiff objected to one of the defendant's document requests on the ground
that the materials requested were protected by the investigative privilege. 2 "5
The defendant requested a hearing on this objection, which he then failed to
attend. 256 The supreme court held that, notwithstanding this failure, the
trial judge abused his discretion by sustaining the plaintiff's objection be-
cause there was no evidence of the applicability of the investigative privilege
offered by plaintiff and no in camera review of the documents undertaken by
the court.257
While the supreme court has announced the fundamental changes that
have taken place over the past several years with respect to the procedures
for claiming privilege, it has been left largely to the intermediate appellate
courts to refine how those procedures are actually carried out by the trial
bench and bar.258 Three cases decided during the survey period address
some of the issues raised by these changing discovery rules. In State Farm
Insurance v. Salinas25 9 a party objecting to discovery faced a trial judge who
refused to allow the party to present evidence in support of its claim of privi-
lege and who would not review the tendered documents in camera.26° The
court of appeals held that mandamus was available to correct this abuse of
discretion. 261 On the other hand, the objecting party in Insurance Company
of North America v. Downey,262 learned that the mere willingness to submit
documents for an in camera inspection was not the same as actually tender-
ing the documents to the court.263 Since the objecting party neither pro-
duced evidence supporting its claimed privilege nor actually tendered the
documents, its statement in a memorandum submitted to the court that it
was "prepared to tender" the requested documents was insufficient.264
Finally, the court in Ryals v. Canales265 discussed the sufficiency of the
evidence relied upon to support a claim of attorney-client privilege. The
court found the affidavit relied upon insufficient. Specifically, the court held
that an affidavit that merely tracks the language of the Texas evidentiary
rule on attorney-client privilege, 266 without providing information sufficient
253. 776 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1989).
254. See supra, notes 151, 152 and accompanying text.
255. 776 S.W.2d at 147. It should be noted that the four dissenting Justices in Loftin
strongly disagreed with the majority's characterization of both the nature of the plaintiff's
objection and the trial court's ruling. Id. at 149-50. The dissenters believed that the trial court
had sustained an overbreadth objection, which they argued did not trigger the procedures for
claiming an exemption from discovery set out in rule 166b(4). Id.
256. 776 S.W.2d at 146.
257. Id. at 148.
258. Id.
259. 767 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, no writ).
260. Id. at 214.
261. Id.
262. 765 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, mand. overr.).
263. Id. at 558.
264. Id.
265. 767 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, mand. overr.).
266. See TEX. R. CIV. EVID. 503(b)(3).
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to demonstrate its application to the facts of the particular case, constituted
no evidence in support of the claimed privilege.2 67
D. Duty to Supplement Discovery
As it has been for the last several years, the duty to supplement discovery
responses proved to be a fertile source of appellate decisions during the sur-
vey period. Rules 166b(6) 268 and 215(5)269 require a party to supplement his
or her discovery responses to disclose the identity of expert witnesses and
persons with knowledge of relevant facts as soon as is practical, and in no
event less than thirty days prior to trial. As every trial practitioner is by now
aware, the sanction for failing to provide this supplementation is the exclu-
sion of the unidentified witness' testimony.2 70 The supreme court has re-
peatedly held that this sanction is automatic unless good cause for allowing
the witness to testify is shown.2 71
In three cases decided during the survey period, the supreme court con-
tinued to urge the trial courts to apply this exclusionary rule strictly. First,
in Boothe v. Hausler,272 the court rejected without discussion the offending
party's argument that denial of the testimony of a proffered witness would
cause him great harm, stating that harm to a party is not sufficient to estab-
lish good cause.273 Significantly, in Boothe, the interrogatory answers identi-
fied the witness in question, but failed to provide her address, which was also
requested.274
Similarly, the court held that no good cause existed to permit the testi-
mony of an unidentified fact witness in Clark v. Trailways, Inc.275 The wit-
ness in question was a Mexican police officer who originally investigated the
accident that gave rise to the action. The trial court allowed the witness to
testify on the basis that, as the original investigating officer, he possessed
peculiar knowledge of the underlying facts.276 The supreme court held that
this rationale for allowing the testimony did not constitute a showing of
good cause.277 Indeed, the court noted that the trial court's ruling would
provide a party with an incentive to withhold the name of a key witness and
then emphasize that witness' peculiar knowledge as a justification for al-
lowing him or her to testify.278
The decision in Clark was also significant for its discussion of what a party
must do to preserve a complaint that an undisclosed witness was permitted
267. 767 S.W.2d at 230.
268. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166b(6).
269. TEX. 1t CIV. P. 215(5).'
270. Id.
271. See Morrow v. H.E.B., Inc., 714 S.W.2d 297, 297-98 (Tex. 1986).
272. 766 S.W.2d 788 (rex. 1989).
273. Id. at 789.
274. Id.
275. 774 S.W.2d 644, 646-47 ('rex. 1989), cert. denied, - U.S. __, 110 S.Ct. 1122, -
L.Ed.2d - (1990).





to testify.279 In this connection, the court held, with Justice Gonzales dis-
senting, that a pretrial motion to prohibit the testimony of undisclosed wit-
nesses was not sufficient to preserve any error for appellate review.280 If a
party fails to object at trial when the undisclosed witness is offered, that
party waives any complaint as to the admission of the witness' testimony.281
Finally, in Rainbo Baking Co. v. Stafford,282 a witness who the plaintiff
failed to identify by her proper name or provide an address for was allowed
to testify over the defendant's objection. 28 3 Plaintiff's showing of good cause
in the trial court consisted principally of her statement that she expected the
case to settle and that she first contacted the witness on the day of trial.284
The supreme court held that this explanation was insufficient to allow the
testimony. 28 5 According to the court, the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
cannot be read as supporting the proposition that supplementation is only
required when a party reasonably expects the case to go to trial.286
Several noteworthy cases from the courts of appeals have also addressed
the issue of supplementing discovery responses. In Clayton v. First State
Bank of Gainesville287 the court held that the rules governing supplementa-
tion apply to all witnesses whose identity is discoverable.288 Thus, no dis-
tinction exists between character witnesses and other fact witnesses in the
context of responding to an interrogatory seeking the identity of persons
with knowledge of relevant facts.289 Conversely, in Tinkle v. Henderson,290
the court stated in dicta that it doubted that a record custodian subpoenaed
at trial was a person with knowledge of relevant facts whose identity would
have to be disclosed in interrogatory answers. 291 The Tinkle court did, how-
ever, hold that the two defendant doctors should not have been allowed to
give expert testimony because they had not been properly identified during
discovery as expert witnesses.292
Finally, Tri-State Motor Transit Co. v. Nicar,293 involved two thorny sub-
issues connected with the duty to supplement. In Nicar, one of the plaintiffs
named a Dr. Hayden as a testifying expert in response to another plaintiff's
interrogatories, but not in response to the defendant's interrogatories. When
279. Id. at 647.
280. Id. at 647 (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 52(a)).
281. 774 S.W.2d at 647 (citations omitted).
282. 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 32 (Oct. 11, 1989).
283. Id. at 381.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. See also Valley Indus., Inc. v. Cook, 767 S.W.2d 458, 461-62 (rex. App.-Dallas
1988, writ denied)(no good cause shown for allowing undisclosed witness to testify where,
despite fact that offering party believed there was an agreement between the parties that issue
of causation would not be contested, any such agreement was unenforceable under TEX. R.
CIV. P. 11).
287. 777 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ).
288. Id. at 579.
289. Id. at 579-80.
290. 777 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1989, writ requested).
291. Id. at 540.
292. Id. at 539.
293. 765 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ).
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the commencement of the trial was delayed due to a scheduling conflict on
the part of the defendant's attorney, Dr. Hayden became unavailable to tes-
tify due to another longstanding commitment. The plaintiff then sought to
have Dr. Hayden's associate, Dr. Hart, testify in her place, which the trial
court allowed.294
Turning first to the adequacy of the identification of Dr. Hayden, the
court of appeals noted that, in the converse situation in another case, it had
allowed a party who had not propounded any interrogatories to object to the
failure of the opposing party to disclose the identity of a witness in response
to interrogatories propounded by a third party.295 The court's belief that a
party must be entitled to rely on the interrogatories and answers of other
parties in the same suit formed the basis for this earlier decision.296 Thus,
the court in Nicar concluded that this same reasoning should apply to the
case before it, where the plaintiff identified Dr. Hayden in one set of interro-
gatory answers but not the other.297 With respect to the substitution of Dr.
Hart for Dr. Hayden, the court found that the plaintiff had shown good
cause for allowing Dr. Hart's testimony.298 Moreover, the court held that
an express finding by the trial court of good cause was not necessary where
the record reflected that such a finding was implicit in the court's decision to
allow the testimony.299
X. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
As in prior years, summary judgment practice was the subject of a number
of important decisions during the Survey period. Foremost among these was
the supreme court's decision in Casso v. Brand,30° which rejected the federal
view on the role of summary judgment motions30 1 and overruled two of the
court's own recent decisions on the subject.302 Casso was a defamation case
brought by the incumbent mayor of the City of McAllen against one of his
challengers for that office. The trial court granted the defendant a summary
judgment based upon his affidavit testimony that he made the statements in
question without actual malice (i.e., without either knowledge that they were
false or reckless disregard for their truth or falsity). 30 3 The court of appeals
294. Id. at 489.
295. 765 S.W.2d at 489 (citing Smith v. Christley, 755 S.W.2d 525, 530 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied)).
296. Christley, 755 S.W.2d at 530.
297. 765 S.W.2d at 489-90.
298. Id. at 490-91
299. Id. at 491; accord Mercy Hosp. of Laredo v. Rios, 776 S.W.2d 626, 632 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 1989, writ requested).
300. 776 S.W.2d 551 (rex. 1989).
301. Id. at 559. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2555, 91
L.Ed.2d 265, 276 (1986), cert. denied 484 U.S. 1066, 108 S. Ct. 1028, L.Ed.2d 992 (1988);
("Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut,
but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed 'to secure thejust, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.' ").
302. 776 S.W.2d at 559, overruling Beaumont Enter. & Journal v. Smith, 687 S.W.2d 729(Tex. 1985) and Bessent v. Times-Herald Printing Co., 709 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. 1986).
303. 776 S.W.2d at 559.
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reversed and remanded, holding that the defendant had failed to negate one
or more elements of the plaintiff's claim as a matter of law.3°4 In an intrigu-
ing decision, which includes Chief Justice Phillips dissenting from the major-
ity opinion he authored, a divided supreme court affirmed in part and
reversed in part.30 5
The majority's opinion on the issue of actual malice begins by declining to
follow the summary judgment standard for defamation cases enunciated by
the United States Supreme Court in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,306
which asks whether the evidence in the record could support a reasonable
jury finding that the plaintiff has proven actual malice.307 The court in
Casso held that, despite the similarities between Federal Rule 56308 and
Texas Rule 166a,309 the burden of proof in Texas summary judgment proce-
dure never shifts to the non-movant unless and until the movant conclu-
sively demonstrates that he or she is entitled to judgment. 310 Moreover, the
majority saw no overriding policy reason for shifting to the federal approach
to summary judgments, either in all cases generally or in cases involving
constitutional rights in particular.311
Notwithstanding its refusal to follow the analysis employed by the federal
courts, however, the supreme court went on to affirm a portion of the sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendant by overruling its own recent deci-
sions in two defamation cases,312 Beaumont Enterprise & Journal v. Smith 313
and Bessent v. Times-Herald Printing Co.314 In both Smith and Bessent the
court held that the defendant's affidavit testimony, stating that he believed
the alleged defamatory statements were true, was evidence of the state of
mind of an interested party that could not readily be controverted and,
therefore, would not support a summary judgment.315 In Casso, however,
the court held that these previous decisions read the requirement that an
interested party's testimony be controvertible too literally,31 6 especially in
the light of the First Amendment considerations attendant to a defamation
case.317 Significantly, however, the court's holding does not appear to be
limited to defamation cases; indeed, the majority opinion contains the state-
ment, unsupported by citations, that in all other types of cases, the Texas
courts do not "deny otherwise appropriate summary judgment motions be-
304. Brand v. Casso, 742 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987), rev'd in part and
aff'd inpart, 776 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1989).
305. 776 S.W.2d at 559.
306. 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
307. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255-56, 106 S.Ct. at 2514, 91 L.Ed.2d at 216.
308. FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
309. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a.
310. Casso, 776 S.W,2d at 556.
311. Id. at 55657.
312. Id. at 558.
313. 687 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. 1985)
314. 709 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. 1986).
315. Bessent, 709 S.W.2d at 636; Smith, 687 S.W.2d at 730; see generally TEX. R. CIV. P.
166a(c) (requirement that interested party's testimony be controvertible).




cause of a subjective determination that the movant's proof cannot be readily
controverted."318
The burden of proof on summary judgment was the subject of the Texas
Supreme Court's decision in Eshleman v. Shield.319 The plaintiffs in Eshle-
man sued under the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act
("DTPA"), 320 alleging misrepresentations and fraudulent alteration of a
home purchase contract. More than two years after the contract was exe-
cuted, the plaintiffs added the listing agent as a defendant, following his dep-
osition in the case. The agent filed a motion for summary judgment on his
affirmative defense of limitations, which was granted by the trial court32 1
and afrmed by the court of appeals.322 The supreme court reversed. 323 In
a per curiam opinion, the court noted that the two year statute of limitations
set out in the DTPA324 begins to run when the plaintiff discovers or, in the
exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the false or decep-
tive act.325 Thus, the agent had the burden on summary judgment to prove,
as a matter of law, that the plaintiffs discovered or reasonably should have
discovered the falsity of the alleged representations more than two years
before suit was filed against him. 326
Several cases decided during the survey period addressed the proper
method of presenting and objecting to summary judgment evidence. For
example, in Rogers v. Ricane Enterprises, Ina,327 the supreme court held
that a general reference in a summary judgment motion to voluminous
materials on fie does not direct the court or the other parties to the evidence
on which the movant relies and is, therefore, insufficient.328 In Mendez v.
International Playtex, Ina.329 the Corpus Christi court of appeals followed
the decision in Deerfield Land Joint Venture v. Southern Union Realty
Co.,330 in requiring that deposition excerpts that a party intends to rely upon
as summary judgment evidence be authenticated and attached to the sum-
mary judgment motion or response.331 The same court, in Executive Condo-
miniums, Inc. v. State of Texas, 332 also recognized that a statement of facts
from a prior trial may properly be considered as summary judgment evi-
dence.333 Presumably, the use of a statement of facts would'be subject to the
same authentication requirements as a deposition transcript under Mendez
318. Id. at 559.
319. 764 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. 1989).
320. See TEX BUS. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.41 et seq. (Vernon 1987).
321. 764 S.W.2d at 776.
322. 764 S.W.2d at 777.
323. Id.
324. See TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE § 17.56 (Vernon 1987).
325. 764 S.W.2d at 777.
326. Id.
327. 772 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. 1989).
328. Id. at 81.
329. 776 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ requested).
330. 758 S.W.2d 608, 610-11 (Tex. App.-Da~las 1988, writ requested).
331. 776 S.W.2d at 733.
332. 764 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied).
333. Id. at 901.
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and Deerfield. Finally, in Utilities Pipeline Co. v. American Petrofina Mar-
keting,334 the court held that, in order to be effective, a ruling by a trial court
sustaining an objection to summary judgment evidence must be reduced to
writing, signed by the trial judge, and entered of record.335 The court fur-
ther held that a docket sheet entry does not meet these requirements. 336
The sufficiency of a party's summary judgment proof was also an issue in
several cases decided during the survey period. Taylor v. Shelton 337 involved
an action for specific performance of a contract for the purchase of oil and
casinghead property. The defendants appealed from a summary judgment
entered against them, arguing, among other things, that the plaintiff had
offered no evidence in support of certain facts found as a matter of law in
connection with the entry of the summary judgment. In response, the plain-
tiffs argued that they had pleaded the performance of all conditions prece-
dent under the contract, and, therefore, the defendants had waived any
complaint by failing to specifically deny performance of any conditions. 338
The court of appeals rejected this argument, holding that, in a summary
judgment proceeding, neither the pleadings nor the non-movant's failure to
respond can establish the moving party's right to judgment.339 Moreover,
the court noted that only two of the facts that were allegedly established as a
matter of law could properly be considered conditions under the contract;
the others were clearly matters requiring summary judgment proof.34 °
In Fair Woman, Inc. v. Transland Management Corp.,341 the court held
that the mere statement that an affiant has personal knowledge of the facts
stated, without more, is insufficient to establish that fundamental require-
ment of summary judgment affidavits. 342 Thus, even though the affidavit
was uncontroverted, the summary judgment based thereon could not
stand.3 43 Similarly, in Shindler v. Mid-Continent Life In surance Co.,344 the
court held that the phrase "as far as I know" in response to a deposition
question was analogous to an affidavit stating facts "to the best of my knowl-
edge."'345 Neither is sufficient to raise a fact issue that will defeat summary
judgment.346
Finally, in an unusual case dealing with the notice provisions under Rule
334. 760 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
335. Id. at 723.
336. Id. See also Vasquez v. Carmel Shopping Center Co., 777 S.W.2d 532, 535 (Tex.
App.--Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied) (in reviewing summary judgment, court of appeals
would consider affidavits filed two days before hearing on summary judgment motion where,
even though no signed order of court granted leave to file such affidavits, docket sheet reflected
leave had been granted).
337. 772 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1989, writ denied).
338. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 54.
339. 772 S.W.2d at 286-87.
340. Id. at 287.
341. 766 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
342. Id. at 334.
343. Id. at 324.
344. 768 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ).




166a,347 the Amarillo court of appealsupheld a summary judgment entered
in favor of the plaintiff,348 but reversed the trial court's refusal to grant the
defendant a new trial.349 Krchnak v. Fulton350 was a suit brought against a
mare owner to recover amounts due for boarding care, stud fees, and veteri-
nary services. The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, which was
served, together with notice of the hearing date, on the defendant himself
without a copy being sent to his attorney. Less than ten days before the
hearing date, defendant's counsel received a copy of the motion. Under the
local rules of Lubbock County, since neither party specifically requested oral
argument, the motion for summary judgment was granted without an actual
hearing being held before the court.351 Later that same day, the court re-
ceived and denied the defendant's motion for an extension of time within
which to respond to the summary judgment motion.352
The court of appeals, after reviewing this chronology of events, held that
the summary judgment was proper.353 While the court emphasized that the
practice of sending pleadings and notices directly to a party without a copy
to his or her attorney is not be encouraged, it is permitted under Rule 21a of
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.354 The court redressed this seemingly
inequitable result, however, by holding that the defendant's motion for new
trial should have been granted and remanding the case to the trial court.355
XI. JURY QUESTIONS35 6
Rule 277 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended effective Jan-
uary 1, 1988, requires in jury cases that the trial court, whenever feasible,
submit the cause upon broad-form questions. 357 Three decisions during the
survey period are instructive on how this mandate is to be carried out. In
Bennett Coulson & Cae, Inc. v. Lake LBJ Municipal Utility District,355 the
supreme court rejected a challenge to the propriety of the conjunctive sub-
mission of two issues of fact in a single question to the jury.359 The court
disagreed with the defendant's contention that the question inquired about a
disputed and an undisputed fact and, therefore, constituted an improper
comment on the weight of the evidence. 36 While one issue had been more
347. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c) (motion and any supporting affidavits shall be filed and
served at least twenty-one days before the time specified for hearing).
348. Krchnak v. Fulton, 759 S.W.2d 524, 530 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, writ denied).
349. Id. at 530.
350. 759 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. App.-Amarilo 1988, writ denied).
351. Id. at 527.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 528.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 529.
356. Pursuant to the 1988 amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the form of
submissions to the jury, long known to the Texas practitioner as special issues, are now
referred to as jury questions. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 271-279.
357. TEX. R. CIV. P. 277.
358. 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. 3. 123 (Dec. 13, 1989).
359. Id. at 125.
360. Id. at 124.
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hotly contested by the parties than the other, that fact alone did not require
submission of the issues separately.361
While Coulson sanctioned the use of compound jury questions, a practi-
tioner must still take care when phrasing such questions. For example, in
Mooney Aircraft Corp. v. Altman,362 a products liability action, the trial
court's charge contained two questions that asked the jury to resolve one
disputed issue if they found a particular way on another disputed issue.363
The jury answered both questions in the affirmative, and the court entered
judgment in favor of the plaintiff.3 " The court of appeals reversed, however,
holding that the use of the introductory "if" clause constituted a direct com-
ment on the weight of the evidence. 365 The court noted that the word "if",
when used as a conjunction, may mean supposing, allowing, or conceding. 366
Accordingly, there was a reasonable probability that the jury believed it was
required to assume or suppose the existence of the disputed fact contained in
the introductory "if" clause.367 Moreover, the plaintiff's effort to distin-
guish the case law relied upon by the defendant on the ground that it pre-
dated the 1988 amendment to Rule 277 was unavailing.368 The defect in this
case, said the court, was not that the questions were submitted broadly, but
that they assumed disputed facts. 36 9
Similarly, the decision in E B. v. Texas Department of Human Services370
cautions against a mechanical approach to formulating broad form submis-
sions. In that case, a mother appealed from a judgment of the trial court
terminating the parent-child relationship between her and her two minor
daughters.371 Under the applicable statute, the parent-child relationship
could be terminated only if the State established one or more specified
grounds by clear and convincing evidence.3 72 The trial court's charge, after
instructing the jury on two of the possible grounds, simply asked whether
the parent-child relationship should be terminated. 373 The court of appeals
held that this charge was defective because it asked the jury to determine the
ultimate legal question of whether the parent-child relationship should be
361. Id. at 125.
362. 772 S.W.2d 540 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
363. Id. at 541. The two questions were: (1) " 'If you find the vacuum pump on the aircraft
was defective at the time it left the possession of [the defendant], was such defect a producing
cause of the occurrence in question?"' and (2) "'If you find that the [defendant] made false
representations to the public that the aircraft was airworthy, did the representation about the
airworthiness of the aircraft involve a material fact concerning the character or quality of the
aircraft in question which was relied on by [plaintiff]?"' Id.
364. Id. at 541.
365. Id. at 543.
366. Id. at 542.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 542-43.
369. Id. Indeed, the court went so far as to suggest how the first question quoted supra at
note 363 could have been properly submitted in broad form: "'At the time that the aircraft
left the possession of [defendant], was there a defect in the vacuum pump that was a producing
cause of the occurrence in question?'" Id. at 543.
370. 766 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, no writ).
371. 776 S.W.2d at 388.
372. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02 (Vernon 1986).
373. 766 S.W.2d at 388.
[Vol. 44
TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE
terminated, rather than the factual question of whether the State had proven
the specific grounds for termination pleaded.374 In addition, under the par-
ticular statute in question, the failure to submit each pleaded ground for
termination separately made it impossible to determine if the State had dis-
charged its burden of convincing at least ten jurors that one or more particu-
lar grounds for termination existed.375
The court addressed the question of whether an issue that was not prop-
erly pleaded may nevertheless be submitted to the jury under the theory that
the issue was tried by consent in Hirsch v. Hirsch,376 a divorce action in
which the petitioner alleged adultery as the sole ground, for the divorce.
During trial, the court admitted evidence of cruelty without objection, 377
although the respondent objected to the submission of a question to the jury
on cruelty because it was not supported by the pleadings. The court held
that, because the respondent had objected to submitting the issue to the jury,
there was no trial by consent.378 Instead, the proper course would have been
for the petitioner, the party requesting submission of an issue raised by the
evidence but not the pleadings, to offer a trial amendment. 379 Finally, the
decision in Elbar, Inc. v. Claussen 380 addressed the issue of what a trial court
may do when an erroneous or improper instruction to the jury causes the
court to render an incomplete verdict. In Elbar, the jury's verdict, as origi-
nally returned failed to answer a necessary question because of an error in its
conditioning instruction.381 Because no objection to the charge had been
made, the court of appeals held that the trial judge was authorized to send
the jury back for further deliberations with a direction to answer the omitted
question.382
XII. JURY PRACTICE
Two decisions during the survey period considered the qualifications of
jurors. Palmer Well Services, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc. 38 3 involved a juror
whom the plaintiff discovered, after the jury returned a ten to two verdict in
favor of the defendant, was the subject of a pending felony indictment. The
statute setting out juror qualification disqualifies any person from serving as
a petit juror if he or she is under indictment for a felony.384 Since the juror
in question was a member of the majority, the plaintiff argued that it was
entitled to a new trial on the ground that the verdict was not rendered by the
374. Id. at 390.
375. Id.; see TEX R. CIV. P. 292 (requiring concurrence of minimum of ten jurors as to
each of answers made).
376. 770 S.W.2d 924 (rex. App.--El Paso 1989, no writ).
377. Id. at 926.
378. Id.
379. Id. (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 66 and 67).
380. 774 S.W.2d 45 (rex. App.-Da~las 1989, writ requested).
381. Id. at 54.
382. Id. at 54-55.
383. 776 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. 1989).
384. TEX. GOVT CODE ANN. § 62.102 (Vernon 1988)
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requisite number of qualified jurors.38 ' The supreme court agreed. 386 Sig-
nificantly, the court held that, in order to give effect to the rules governing
juror qualifications, it would presume that the plaintiff suffered a material
injury.387 Thus, the court distinguished cases involving the minimum juror
qualifications prescribed by statute from other instances in which a new trial
is sought on the ground that a juror gave an erroneous or incorrect answer
on voir dire.38 In the latter situation, a new trial will only be granted if it
reasonably appears from the record that the error prejudiced or injured the
complaining party.3 9
In contrast to Palmer Well Services, the court of appeals in Mercy Hospital
of Laredo v. Rios 390 rejected a claim that the alleged failure of one of the
majority jurors in another ten to two verdict to meet the literacy qualifica-
tion under Texas law391 constituted reversible error.392 While that part of
the decision upholding the trial court's implied finding of literacy would
have been a sufficient ground for affirmance, 393 the appellate court stated
two alternative holdings3 94 both of which are suspect in light of the supreme
court's decision in Palmer Well Services. First, the court held that any error
was waived because the only inquiry regarding qualifications was made by
the trial judge of the entire venire panel,395 and the complaining party had
not individually interrogated the particular juror on that issue.396 It ap-
pears, however, that this same situation existed in Palmer Well Services,
although the supreme court did not expressly address a waiver argument in
that case. 397 Second, the Rios court concluded that the failure to meet the
statutorily-mandated literacy qualification was not reversible error, espe-
cially when the juror possessed an under standing of the English lan-
guage.398 This too appears to fly in the face of the supreme court's holding
that the acceptance of a juror who lacks the minimum qualifications consti-
tutes a material injury as a matter of law.399
During the survey period, the supreme court also addressed the issue of
the proper scope of voir dire in its opinion on rehearing in Babcock v. North-
west Memorial Hospital.400 As reported in the 1989 Annual Survey, in its
original opinion in Babcock, the court held that it was reversible error for a
385. 776 S.W.2d at 576.
386. Id. at 577.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 576-77.
389. TEX. R. CIV. P. 327(a); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 81(b)(1) (providing that courts
shall not reverse judgments on appeal unless court determines that error complained of was
reasonably calculated to cause, and probably did cause, rendition of improper judgment).
390. 776 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ requested).
391. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 62.102 (Vernon 1988).
392. 776 S.W.2d at 629.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 628.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 628.
397. See Palmer Well Services, 776 S.W.2d at 576.
398. Rios, 776 S.W.2d at 628.
399. Palmer Well Services, 776 S.W.2d at 577.
400. 767 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1989).
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trial court to prohibit the plaintiffs' attorney in a medical malpractice case
from questioning prospective jurors about their attitudes regarding the pub-
licity about the so-called lawsuit or liability crisis.401 The court reaffirmed
this conclusion on rehearing in an opinion that was substantially the same as
its original opinion.4°2 Indeed, the only difference between the two was the
way the court treated the defendant's argument that any error in prohibiting
the requested voir dire was harmless. 4° 3 In the original opinion, the court
held that, because the questions were not asked of the veniremen, the court
could only speculate as to how they might have responded and, therefore,
could not say that the trial court's action did not prejudice the plaintiffs.4°4
On rehearing, however, the court countered the harmless error argument
with the statement that the trial court's action resulted in a denial of the
plaintiffs' constitutional right to a trial before a fair and impartial jury and
was, therefore, harmful.405 Although the court apparently intended to ad-
dress the absence of any evidence in the record that the error was harmful by
shifting the analysis of this issue to the context of the fundamental right to
trial by jury, it is difficult to see a distinction between Babcock and any other
case in which a party can demonstrate that the trial court improperly limited
voir dire. Thus, the court may have unwittingly opened the door to many
more claims of this nature.
An unsuccessful litigant's effort to gain a new trial on the ground of jury
misconduct will routinely be met with the obstacle imposed by the proce-
dural and evidentiary rules that bar the admission of testimony or other evi-
dence obtained from jurors, except to the extent the evidence demonstrates
an outside influence on the jury's deliberations. 406 Several decisions during
the survey period demonstrate how strictly the Texas courts construe this
exception. In Kendall v. Whataburger, Inc.407 the court held that erroneous
information given to the jury by the presiding juror, a paralegal, regarding
the effect of their answers was not an outside influence.408 Similarly, in King
v. Bauer,4° the court did not consider evidence of the jurors' discussions of
insurance and their own personal experiences and knowledge as evidence of
jury misconduct.410 In both King and Mercy Hospital of Laredo v. Rios,411
moreover, the court held that discussion of a newspaper account of the trial
read by one or more jurors did not constitute an outside influence.412 Fi-
nally, in Eppoleto v. Bournias,413 the court held that a trial court's error in
401. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 146, 149 (Dec. 14, 1988).
402. 767 S.W.2d at 705-09.
403. Id.
404. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 149.
405. 767 S.W.2d at 709.
406. TEX. R. CIV. P. 327(b); TEX. R. CIV. EVID. 606(b).
407. 759 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. App.-Houston list Dist.] 1988, no writ).
408. Id. at 755.
409. 767 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied).
410. Id. at 198.
411.. 776 S.W.2d 626 (rex. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ requested).
412.. Id. at 630; King v. Bauer, 767 S.W.2d at 198.
413. 764 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. App.-Waco 1989, no writ).
1990]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
removing a case from its jury docket could be corrected by mandamus. 414
The court reasoned that requiring the plaintiffs to go through a full trial
without a jury, and then appeal, was not a remedy that was equally conve-
nient, effective, or beneficial as mandamus.415
XIII. JUDGMENT, DISMISSAL, AND MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL
In LBL Oil Co. v. International Power Services, Inc.,41 6 the supreme court
once again considered the effect on Texas procedure of the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc 4 17 In
LBL the plaintiff sued LBL Oil Company, alleging that LBL was a Texas
corporation, and the return of citation reflected service on a registered agent.
R. H. Lindley, a citizen of Oklahoma, filed a pro se motion to dismiss, alleg-
ing that he was the sole owner of LBL Oil Company, an unincorporated
business, and that the court did not have jurisdiction over him since there
had been no valid service of process. The trial court overruled this mo-
tion.418 The plaintiff then filed a motion for default judgment on the ground
that the defendant, by its defective motion to dismiss, had entered a general
appearance. Notwithstanding the fact that the motion for default judgment
had not been served on the defendant, and no notice of the hearing on the
motion, had been given to it, the trial court entered a default judgment,
which the court of appeals affirmed. 419 The supreme court, in a per curiam
opinion, reversed and remanded the case to the trial court.420 Relying on
Peralta, the court held that, once a defendant makes an appearance in a suit,
he is entitled to receive notice of any trial setting as a matter of due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.4 21 Thus, the
same defective motion that conferred jurisdiction over the defendant re-
quired that it receive notice of the hearing on the motion for default judg-
ment since it was dispositive of the case.422
XIV. APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Several cases decided during the survey period involved questions regard-
ing jurisdiction. In Ferguson v. DRG/Colony North, Ltd.423 for example, the
court addressed two separate jurisdictional issues presented by the appeal.424
A purchaser of apartment buildings sued the vendor, seeking rescission of
the sales contract or, alternatively, damages for the vendor's breach of the
414. Id. at 286.
415. Id. (citing Jampole v. Touchy, 673 S.W.2d 569, 576 (rex. 1984)).
416. 777 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1989).
417. 485 U.S. 80, 108 S.Ct. 896, 99 L.Ed.2d 75 (1988). The court previously had occasion
to apply Peralta in Lopez v. Lopez, 757 S.W.2d 721 ('ex. 1988). a case discussed in the 1989
ANNUAL SURVEY.
418. 777 S.W.2d at 390.
419. Id.
420. Id. at 390-91.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 391.
423. 764 S.W.2d 874 (rex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied).
424. Id. at 879-80.
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contract. After the jury returned a verdict favorable to the purchaser, the
trial court entered a judgment ordering rescission, together with an alterna-
tive award of damages to take effect only if the rescission order was later
reversed by an appellate court.425 On appeal, the vendor argued that the
trial court's judgment was not final or appealable because the judgment was
a conditional award which did not require the purchaser to make an election
of remedies. 426 The court of appeals disagreed, concluding that the judg-
ment was not truly in the alternative, nor any more indefinite than a judg-
ment that awards additional attorney's fees in the event of an appeal.427
Because the relief granted was clear and definite, and there was nothing left
for the trial court to decide, the appellate court held that the judgment was
final and appealable.428
That determination, however, did not end the jurisdictional inquiry.
Whenever an appellate court reverses a trial court's judgment, the appellate
court has the further duty to render whatever judgment the trial court
should have entered, except when a remand is necessary.429 Since the Texas
Constitution reserves that power to appellate courts,4 30 the Ferguson court
concluded that a trial court cannot constitutionally perform the same func-
tion.431 According to the court, therefore, the trial court lacked authority to
include an alternative award in the event of a reversal on appeal, and that
portion of the trial court's judgment was erroneous. 432
Bethurum v. Holland4 3 also dealt with the finality of trial court judg-
ments for purposes of appellate review. The defendants in Bethurum ob-
tained a summary judgment dismissing all of the claims asserted against
them by the plaintiffs. 434 The judgment did not dispose of defendants' coun-
terclaim, however, which was not a subject of the summary judgment mo-
tion.435 Nevertheless, the judgment signed by the trial court mistakenly
included "Mother Hubbard" language that denied all relief not expressly
425. Id. at 877.
426. See Hinde v. Hinde, 701 S.W.2d 637, 639 (rex. 1985) (appellate courts can review
only final and definite judgments); Hill v. Hill, 404 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1966, no writ)(as general rule judgments must not be conditional).
427. 764 S.W.2d at 879; see International Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Spray, 468 S.W.2d 347, 349-
50 rex. 1971) (award of additional attorney's fees in event of appeal affirmed, because clerk
could determine from file alone whether appeal was taken, thus achieved certainty as
judgment).
428. 764 S.W.2d at 879.
429. Id. at 880; see TEX. R. APP. P. 81(c).
430. SE TEx. CoNsT. art. V, § 8.
431. 764 S.W.2d at 880. Pursuant to TEx. CONsT. art V, § 8, the jurisdiction of district
courts consists of exclusive, appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and
remedies except in cases where exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred
by the constitution or other law on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body.
432. 764 S.W.2d at 880. The court's holding did not require a reversal, however, since the
rescission award was in no way dependent on the contingent damage award. Id., citing Blair
v. State, 640 S.W.2d 867, 867 (Tex. 1982) (judgment may be void in part and valid in part as
long as valid portion is not dependent on void portion).
433. 771 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1989, no writ).
434. Id. at 720.
435. Id. at 720-21.
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granted in the judgment.436 After plaintiffs appealed the judgment, defend-
ants moved to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction on the basis that
the judgment was an interlocutory, unappealable order because it failed to
dispose of defendants' counterclaims which had yet to be presented to the
trial court. Defendants' motion to dismiss was not filed until more than
thirty days after the filing of the transcript in the court of appeals, however,
and plaintiffs urged the court to deny the motion on the basis of
untimeliness. 437
In granting defendants' motion to dismiss the appeal, the court held that a
party does not waive his jurisdictional challenge by failing to timely file a
motion to dismiss. 438 The court also concluded that the question ofjurisdic-
tion was fundamental, so that the court could not blindly ignore the issue
even if the parties failed to raise the matter themselves.439 Finally, the court
held that its inquiry into the true nature of the summary judgment was ap-
propriate, notwithstanding the "Mother Hubbard" clause, because a sum-
mary judgment is interlocutory and unappealable if in reality it is only a
partial summary judgment.440
Rule 296 requires the presiding judge in a bench trial to make written
findings of fact and conclusions of law if either party files a request within
ten days after the final judgment is signed."' If the trial judge fails to pre-
pare and file his findings within thirty days after the judgment, the party
who made the initial request has five days in which to call this omission to
the court's attention; otherwise, the party cannot complain about the trial
judge's failure on appeal." 2 In Cherne Industries, Inc v. Magallanes" 3 the
supreme court reversed a decision of the Corpus Christi court of appeals that
had held that the initial request for findings and conclusions must be both
filed and presented to the trial judge within ten days.A" Such a requirement,
concluded the supreme court, was not justified by the plain language of Rule
296,"5 which requires only that the initial request be filed within ten days
after the judgment is signed.446 Although unnecessary to the decision in
Cherne, the court went further and held that a party need never present the
436. Id. at 722.
437. Id. at 722. TEX. R. APP. P. 72 provides that motions to dismiss an appeal for want
of jurisdiction shall be made, filed and docketed within thirty days after the filing of the tran-
script in the court of appeals.
438. 771 S.W.2d at 722 (citing Walker v. Cleere, 141 Tex. 550, 174 S.W.2d 956, 958
(1943)).
439. 771 S.W.2d at 722; see McCauley v. Consolidated Underwriters, 157 Tex. 475, 304
S.W.2d 265, 266 (1957); Marshall v. Brown, 635 S.W.2d 578, 580 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1982,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). The court also observed that TEX. R. CIV. P. 72, which specifies the time
period for filing a motion to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction, permits the court to
entertain any late-filed motion upon such terms as the court deems just and proper. 771
S.W.2d at 722.
440. 771 S.W.2d at 722-23 (citing Teer v. Duddlesten, 664 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex. 1984)).
441. TEX. R. CIV. P. 296.
442. TEX. R. CIV. P. 297.
443. 763 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. 1989).
444. Id. at 770, overruling Lassiter v. Bliss, 559 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1977).
445. TEx. R. Civ. P. 296.
446. 763 S.W.2d at 770; TEX. R. CIV. P. 296.
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initial request to the trial court in order to comply with the rule.447 Accord-
ing to the court, presentment of an initial request for findings and conclu-
sions is unnecessary." 8  If a trial judge fails to comply with the initial
request, the more rigorous procedure of Rule 297 ensures that the trial court
is apprised in a timely fashion of the requesting party's continued interest in
obtaining the court's findings and conclusions.449 Finally, because the trial
court's duty to file findings and conclusions is mandatory, the supreme court
held that the trial judge's failure in Cherne to respond to the plaintiff's re-
quest was presumed harmful and constituted reversible error.450
Rule 329b provides a trial court with plenary power to vacate, modify,
correct, or reform its jtdgment within thirty days after the court signs the
judgment or thirty days after all timely motions for new trial are overruled.
If a court modifies, corrects or reforms a judgment in any respect, the time
for appeal runs from the date the court signs such altered judgment.451 Ap-
plying this rule literally, the court in Check v. Mitchell 452 held that any
change made to a judgment during the plenary period, whether or not it is
material or substantial, operates to delay the commencement of the appellate
timetable.453
Another case decided by the supreme court during the survey period in-
volved an issue about the time period for prosecuting an appeal. In Garcia v.
Kastner Farms, InC454 the trial court rendered a take nothing judgment
against the plaintiff.455 Because the plaintiff did not file a motion for new
trial, his appellate cost bond was due within thirty days after the judgment
was signed 456 Although the plaintiff did not file his cost bond within the
required period, the plaintiff did timely move for an extension of time on the
basis that he could not adequately determine the propriety or necessity of an
appeal until receipt of the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of
law, which the court did not complete until more than thirty days after the
court signed the judgment.457 The court of appeals denied the plaintiff's
motion and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.458 The court re-
447. 763 S.W.2d at 770. In so holding, the court overruled a long line of cases which held
that a party must present to the trial judge both the initial request under rule 296 and the
second request under rule 297. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Bliss, 559 S.W.2d 353, 358 (rex. 1977)
(requiring separate presentment of request for findings and conclusions).
448. 763 S.W.2d at 772.
449. Id.; TEX. 1. CIV. P. 297.
450. 763 S.W.2d at 772; see Wagner v. Riske, 142 Tex. 337, 343, 178 S.W.2d 117, 120
(1944) (trial court's failure to respond when all requests have been properly made is presumed
harmful unless record affirmatively shows no injury to complaining party).
451. TEX R. CIV. P. 329b(h).
452. 758 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. 1988).
453. Id. at 756.
454. 774 S.W.2d 668 (rex. 1989).
455. Id. at 669.
456. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41(a)(l).
457. TEX. R. APP. P. 41(a)(2) provides that the appellate court may grant an extension of
time for filing the cost bond, if the the party files the bond within 15 days of the deadline,
together with a motion reasonably explaining the need for the extension.
458. Garcia v. Kastner Farms, Inc., 761 S.W.2d 444, 446 (rex. App.--Corpus Christi
1988), rev'd, 774 S.W.2d 668 (rex. 1989).
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marked that the decision by plaintiff's counsel to postpone his decision on
whether or not to appeal until he reviewed the trial court's findings and
conclusions had a certain amount of commendable professionalism. 459 Nev-
ertheless, the court concluded that the untimeliness of the appeal resulted
from a conscious and deliberate decision by plaintiff's counsel not to file the
bond within the required time period." 0
The supreme court reached the opposite conclusion and held that the late
filing was due to the attorney's misunderstanding of the law, which was a
reasonable explanation for an extension within the ambit of Rule 41(a)(2).46
Pointing to its prior holding in Meshwert v. Meshwert,462 the court noted
that the reasonable explanation standard set forth in Rule 41(a)(2) was a
relaxed requirement from the old standard of good cause.463 This liberal
standard of review, said the court, even encompas ses the negligence of coun-
sel as a reasonable explanation for needing an extension." The decision in
Garcia that any conduct short of deliberate or intentional noncompliance
qualifies as inadvertence, mistake or mischance---even if that conduct can
also be characterized as professional negligence--should resolve prior incon-
sistencies in the application of Rule 41(a)(2) by the various courts of
appeal."65
Finally, in Donwerth v. Preston II Chrysler-Dodge,"66 the supreme court
reaffirmed its prior holding" 7 that, unless an appellant limits an appeal pur-
suant to Rule 40(a)(4),4 8 an appellee may complain by cross-point in his
brief to the court of appeals of any error in the trial court between the appel-
lant and the appellee without perfecting an independent appeal." 9 The
court noted, however, that this rule for appeals to the court of appeals differs
from the rule for appeals to the supreme court.470 To obtain a different and
more favorable judgment in the supreme court than that rendered by the
court of appeals, a party must file a timely motion for rehearing and an
application for writ of error in the court of appeals. 471
459. 761 S.W.2d at 446.
460. Id.
461. 774 S.W.2d at 670.
462. 549 S.W.2d 383, 384 (rex. 1977).
463. 774 S.W.2d at 670.
464. Id.
465. Id. Compare Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Group Holding Corp., 751 S.W.2d
229, 231-32 (rex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied) (professional negligence that is not deliber-
ate or intentional noncompliance qualifies as inadvertence) with Home Ins. Co. v. Espinoza,
644 S.W.2d 44, 45 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christ 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (failure to ade-
quately familiarize oneself with basic rules of appellate procedure is not reasonable
explanation).
466. 775 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. 1989).
467. Id. at 639; see Hernandez v. City of Ft. Worth, 617 S.W.2d 923, 924 (Tex. 1981).
468. TEX. R. APP. P. 40(a)(4).
469. 775 S.W.2d at 639.
470. Id. at 639, n.5.
471. Id. (citing Archuleta v. International Ins. Co., 667 S.W.2d 120, 123 (Tex. 1984)).
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XV. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Witnesses at Trial
"The rule," derived from Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 267472 and Texas
Rule of Civil Evidence,473 provides for the exclusion of witnesses from the
courtroom so that they cannot hear and be influenced by the testimony of
other witnesses.474 Prior to the adoption of the Rules of Evidence, the exclu-
sion of witnesses was discretionary with the trial court; however, under the
wording of the new rule, the court must exclude witnesses upon the request
of a party.475 The rule exempts three classes of witnesses from its operation,
however, including any person whose presence is essential to the presenta-
tion of a party's case.476 Elbar, Ina v. Claussen477 holds that this latter
exemption covers a party's expert witnesses.478 According to the court,
therefore, the trial judge did not err in refusing to exclude plaintiff's accident
reconstruction expert from the courtroom following defendants' invocation
of the rule.479
B. Motions for Judgment in Bench Trials
In Qantel Business Systems, Inc. v. Custom Controls Co.480 a case of some
significance to the practitioner, the supreme court changed the appellate
standard for review of a trial court's entry of judgment in a bench trial fol-
lowing the plaintiff's case-in-chief.481 When faced with a motion for di-
rected verdict at the close of the plaintiff's case in a jury trial, a trial judge
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and direct
a verdict only when the plaintiff presents no evidence to support his cause of
action.482 In Lorino v. Crawford Packing Co. 483 the court of appeals held
that this standard for a directed verdict in a jury trial applies equally to the
granting of a motion for judgment in a trial to the court.4 ' Since the Lorino
decision in 1943, courts have routinely and mechanically followed this
472. TEX. R. CIV. P. 267.
473. TEX. R. CIV. EVID. 614.
474. TEX R. CIV. P. 267; TEX. R. CIV. EVID. 614.
475. Id. Compare Triton Oil & Gas Corp. v. E.W. Moran Drilling Co., 509 S.W.2d 678,
684 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (rule is discretionary, not mandatory)
with TEx. R. Civ. EviD. 614 (court shall order witnesses excluded) and Tex. R. Civ. P. 267(a)
(witnesses shall be sworn and removed from courtroom).
476. TEX. R. CIV. P. 267(b); TEX. R. CIV. EVID. 614.
477. 774 S.W.2d 45 (rex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ requested). The decision in Elbar ac-
cords with earlier cases decided prior to the adoption of the Texas Rules of Evidence. See, eg.,
Triton, 509 S.W.2d at 685.
478. Elbar, 774 S.W.2d at 51-52.
479. 774 S.W.2d at 52. Although the court of appeals observed that defendant failed to
invoke the rule until after tes timony had begun, the court did not address whether defendant
waived the rule's protections by the timing of his request. Id. at 51.
480. 761 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. 1988).
481. Id. at 303-05.
482. Id. at 303-04; see White v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 651 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Tex.
1983); Collora v. Navarro, 574 S.W.2d 65, 68 (Tex. 1978).




rule.485 Nevertheless, Commentators have severely criticized the Lorino rule
as fostering judicial inefficiency. 486 The court in Qantel finally concluded
that this criticism was meritorious.4 7 According to the court, a plaintiff
who rests indicates that he has fully developed his case, and no useful pur-
pose is served by requiring the trial judge to hear the defendant's evidence
when, as the trier of fact, the judge is unpersuaded by the plaintiff's case.488
Instead, a trial judge should be allowed in those cases to rule on both the
factual and legal issues at the close of the plaintiff's case and make factual
findings at that time if requested by a party.48 9 For that reason, the Qantel
court overruled the Lorino rule and held that a trial judge granting a motion
for judgment at the conclusion of plaintiffs' case is presumed to have ruled
on the factual sufficiency of the evidence. 490
C. Sanctions
In Mackie v. KoslowS4 91 the court of appeals questioned a trial court's
power to impose sanctions on a party who refused to comply with the court's
order requiring the parties to confer about the status of the case. The trial
court in Mackie sent a letter to the parties requesting them to confer about
various pretrial matters and to provide the court with a status report.492
The letter also advised the parties that failure to comply with the request
could result in a show cause hearing in which the court would consider im-
posing sanctions on the recalcitrant party. After the defendants, who were
appearing in the case pro se, failed to confer with their opponents or to ap-
pear at the subsequently scheduled show cause hearing, the court entered a
default judgment in favor of the plaintiff.493
Although the court of appeals refused to condone defendants' conduct, it
nevertheless reversed the default judgment, holding that the trial court was
not empowered to sanction the defendants for a failure to confer with their
opponent.494 The court reached this conclusion only after considering all
three possible sources alleged by plaintiff as bases for the trial court's power
to enter a default judgment in the case.495 To begin with, the court found no
authority for the trial judge's action under Rule 166496 that, while it permits
a judge to order the parties to appear before the court for a conference, does
485. See Stegman v. Chavers, 704 S.W.2d 793, 794 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ); see
also 4 McDonald, TExAs CIVIL PRACTICE, § 16.04 (1984) (discussing Lorino rule).
486. See R.W.M. v. J.C.M., 684 S.W.2d 746, 751-53 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1984,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (Gonzalez, J., dissenting); Guthrie v. Ray, 556 S.W.2d 589, 591 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
487. 761 S.W.2d at 304.
488. Id.
489. Id.
490. Id. at 305. By so holding, the supreme court changed the appellate standard of review
in such cases from a standard of legal insufficiency to a standard of factual insufficiency.
491. 774 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, writ requested).
492. Id. at 741-42.
493. Id. at 742,
494. Id. at 743.
495. Id. at 742-43.
496. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166.
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not authorize an order that the parties confer with each other outside the
court.497 Similarly, the local court rule498 relied on by plaintiff failed to pro-
vide for a sanction of dismissal or default.499 Finally, the court declared
Rule 215500 inapplicable since it pertains to discovery disputes and not pre-
trial matters before the court.501 Finally, in Goad v. Goad502 the court held
that a trial court has inherent power under Rule 13503 to deal with sanctions
even after entry of the judgment.504 Thus, according to the court, a trial
judge may include an award of sanctions in the final judgment or a judge can
enter a separate order concerning sanctions before or after signing the
judgment.505
D. Attorney Fees
Section 38.001506 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code gener-
ally authorizes the recovery of attorney's fees for certain type of claims. 50 7
Several years ago, in Gates v. City of Dallas,508 the supreme court held that
the statutory predecessor of § 38.001 applied to municipal corporations
when they were engaged in propriety, as opposed to governmental, func-
tions.509 Noting that a recent statute510 enacted in response to Gates effec-
tively amended § 38.001, the court in City of Terrell v. McFarland511 held
that § 38.001 no longer authorizes an award of attorney's fees against a city
regardless of whether the city is acting in a governmental or a propriety
capacity.5 12
497. 774 S.W.2d at 742.
498. See DALLAS, TEx. Civ. DwSr. Cr. R. 1.11 (preparation for pre-trial).
499. 774 S.W.2d at 743. The court also observed that, like TEX. R. CIV. P. 166, the
Dallas local rule related to pretrial conferences with the court, and not conferences between
the parties outside the court.
500. TEX. R. CIV. P. 215(2)(b) provides a laundry list of sanctions available to the court
in the event that a party fails to comply with a discovery request or a court order relating to
discovery.
501. 774 S.W.2d at 743.
502. 768 S.W.2d 356 ('ex. App.-Texarkana 1989, writ denied, cert. denied - U.S.-,
110 S.Ct. 722, - L.Ed.2d - (1990)).
503. TEX. R. CIV. P. 13.
504. Id.
505. 768 S.W.2d at 358. The court also held that the notice procedures contained in the
summary judgment rule do not apply to rule 13 sanctions, and a court may impose sanctions
sua sponte without any prior notice. Id. Compare TEX. R. CIV. P. 13 .with TEX. R. CIV. P.
166a.
506. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (Vernon 1986).
507. Id.
508. 704 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. 1986).
509. Id. at 740.
510. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1269j-13 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
511. 766 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
512. Id. at 813.
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